Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings
LMVD-ID: cad3fa61
Paper published February 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Infectious Multi-Agent Jailbreak

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in multi-agent environments are vulnerable to "infectious jailbreak," where a single adversarial image injected into the memory of one agent can cause nearly all agents to…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • GPT-4V
  • InstructBLIP
  • LLaVA 1.5

Description

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in multi-agent environments are vulnerable to "infectious jailbreak," where a single adversarial image injected into the memory of one agent can cause nearly all agents to exhibit harmful behaviors exponentially fast through agent-to-agent interaction. The adversarial image acts as a "virus," spreading via pairwise chats without further attacker intervention.

Examples

See https://github.com/sail-sg/Agent-Smith (opens in a new tab). The repository contains the code and methodology to reproduce the attack. Specific adversarial image examples are also provided.

Impact

Near-total compromise of a multi-agent MLLM system, leading to the generation of harmful content and potentially dangerous actions if integrated with physical systems (robots, etc.). The exponential spread significantly amplifies the impact compared to individual agent jailbreaks.

Affected Systems

Multi-agent systems utilizing MLLMs, particularly those with memory banks and mechanisms enabling agent-to-agent communication (e.g., pairwise chat), such as systems leveraging LLaVA-1.5 or InstructBLIP.

Mitigation Steps

  • Restrict Agent Interactions: Limit or carefully control the degree and nature of communication between agents. Reduce the frequency or opportunities for image or information exchange.
  • Memory Sanitization: Implement mechanisms to periodically sanitize or review agents' memory banks for adversarial content. Regularly purge or filter the memory.
  • Enhanced Detection: Develop robust methods to detect and flag adversarial images or text within the agent's memory. This requires mechanisms to distinguish between benign and malicious content in the context of agent interactions.
  • Agent Recovery Mechanisms: Design and implement active mechanisms that can quickly recover infected agents to a safe state. This should function robustly even with many infected agents.
  • Robust Model Design: Investigate and improve MLLM model architectures to be less susceptible to infectious jailbreak attacks. This is a longer-term research challenge, focusing on fundamental vulnerabilities.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Not explicitly classified; consult the primary paper..
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multi-agent systems utilizing MLLMs, particularly those with memory banks and mechanisms enabling agent-to-agent communication (e.g., pairwise chat), such as systems leveraging LLaVA-1.5 or InstructBLIP.

Research Paper

Agent smith: A single image can jailbreak one million multimodal llm agents exponentially fast

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08567