The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Infectious Multi-Agent Jailbreak
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in multi-agent environments are vulnerable to "infectious jailbreak," where a single adversarial image injected into the memory of one agent can cause nearly all agents to…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- GPT-4V
- InstructBLIP
- LLaVA 1.5
Description
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in multi-agent environments are vulnerable to "infectious jailbreak," where a single adversarial image injected into the memory of one agent can cause nearly all agents to exhibit harmful behaviors exponentially fast through agent-to-agent interaction. The adversarial image acts as a "virus," spreading via pairwise chats without further attacker intervention.
Examples
See https://github.com/sail-sg/Agent-Smith (opens in a new tab). The repository contains the code and methodology to reproduce the attack. Specific adversarial image examples are also provided.
Impact
Near-total compromise of a multi-agent MLLM system, leading to the generation of harmful content and potentially dangerous actions if integrated with physical systems (robots, etc.). The exponential spread significantly amplifies the impact compared to individual agent jailbreaks.
Affected Systems
Multi-agent systems utilizing MLLMs, particularly those with memory banks and mechanisms enabling agent-to-agent communication (e.g., pairwise chat), such as systems leveraging LLaVA-1.5 or InstructBLIP.
Mitigation Steps
- Restrict Agent Interactions: Limit or carefully control the degree and nature of communication between agents. Reduce the frequency or opportunities for image or information exchange.
- Memory Sanitization: Implement mechanisms to periodically sanitize or review agents' memory banks for adversarial content. Regularly purge or filter the memory.
- Enhanced Detection: Develop robust methods to detect and flag adversarial images or text within the agent's memory. This requires mechanisms to distinguish between benign and malicious content in the context of agent interactions.
- Agent Recovery Mechanisms: Design and implement active mechanisms that can quickly recover infected agents to a safe state. This should function robustly even with many infected agents.
- Robust Model Design: Investigate and improve MLLM model architectures to be less susceptible to infectious jailbreak attacks. This is a longer-term research challenge, focusing on fundamental vulnerabilities.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Not explicitly classified; consult the primary paper..
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Multi-agent systems utilizing MLLMs, particularly those with memory banks and mechanisms enabling agent-to-agent communication (e.g., pairwise chat), such as systems leveraging LLaVA-1.5 or InstructBLIP.
Research Paper
Agent smith: A single image can jailbreak one million multimodal llm agents exponentially fast
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08567Related research
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- Agentic Robot Instruction Attack
Published March 1, 2026 · prompt-layer, injection, jailbreak