The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Implicit Clue Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an indirect jailbreak attack, termed "Puzzler," which leverages implicit clues instead of explicit malicious intent in prompts. By providing associated behaviors or hints…
Paper-evaluated models(6)
Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +3 more
- Gemini Pro
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- GPT-4 Turbo
- Llama 13B
- Llama 7B
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an indirect jailbreak attack, termed "Puzzler," which leverages implicit clues instead of explicit malicious intent in prompts. By providing associated behaviors or hints related to a malicious query, Puzzler elicits malicious responses from the LLM, bypassing its safety mechanisms. The attack works by first obtaining "defensive measures" from the LLM against a target malicious action, then querying for the corresponding "offensive measures" that circumvent those defenses. These offensive measures, presented as implicit clues, indirectly lead the LLM to generate the originally requested malicious output.
Examples
See paper.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass LLM safety filters and obtain malicious outputs, such as instructions for illegal activities, harmful content generation, or sensitive information extraction. This undermines the intended safety and security of the LLM and its applications.
Affected Systems
Various LLMs, including but not limited to, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4-Turbo, Gemini-Pro, LLaMA 7B, and LLaMA 13B. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs using similar safety mechanisms.
Mitigation Steps
- Improve LLM safety mechanisms to detect and prevent indirect attacks that infer malicious intent from seemingly benign prompts.
- Develop more robust methods for detecting and filtering implicit clues related to malicious activities.
- Implement multi-layered safety systems to cross-reference and verify LLM responses before releasing them to users.
- Enhance prompt sanitization techniques to prevent the introduction of implicit clues that could trigger malicious behavior.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Various LLMs, including but not limited to, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4-Turbo, Gemini-Pro, LLaMA 7B, and LLaMA 13B. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs using similar safety mechanisms.
Research Paper
Play guessing game with llm: Indirect jailbreak attack with implicit clues
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
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