The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
VLM RedTeaming Jailbreak
Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, IDEATOR, which leverages a separate VLM to generate malicious image-text pairs. The attacker VLM iteratively refines its prompts…
Paper-evaluated models(13)
MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B, InstructBLIP, Chameleon +10 more
- MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
- InstructBLIP
- Chameleon
- LLaVA-OneVision
- MiniGPT-v2
- Llama 3.2 11B Vision
- Llama 3.2 90B Vision
- GPT-4o Mini
- GPT-4o
- Gemini 1.5 Pro
- Gemini 2.0 Flash
- Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet
Description
Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, IDEATOR, which leverages a separate VLM to generate malicious image-text pairs. The attacker VLM iteratively refines its prompts based on the target VLM's responses, bypassing safety mechanisms by generating contextually relevant and visually subtle malicious prompts.
Examples
See the IDEATOR paper (the provided text). Specific examples of successful attacks against MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, InstructBLIP, and Meta's Chameleon are detailed within along with the generated image-text pairs.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass built-in safety restrictions of VLMs, eliciting harmful outputs (e.g., instructions for illegal activities, hate speech, disinformation). The high success rate (94% against MiniGPT-4) and transferability across different VLMs highlight the severity of this vulnerability.
Affected Systems
Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including but not limited to MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, InstructBLIP, and Meta's Chameleon. Other VLMs employing similar architectures and safety mechanisms are likely affected.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement more robust safety mechanisms that are resistant to iterative adversarial attacks.
- Develop detection methods for identifying and blocking malicious image-text pairs generated by techniques such as IDEATOR.
- Further research into improving the robustness of VLMs against adversarial attacks is needed. Regularly evaluate and update safety mechanisms.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Vision-language models; Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including but not limited to MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, InstructBLIP, and Meta's Chameleon. Other VLMs employing similar architectures and safety mechanisms are likely affected.
Research Paper
IDEATOR: Jailbreaking and Benchmarking Large Vision-Language Models Using Themselves
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00827Related research
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