The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Embodied AI Policy Jailbreak
LLM-based planning modules in embodied AI systems are vulnerable to Policy Executable (POEX) jailbreak attacks. Attackers can inject carefully crafted adversarial suffixes into user instructions, causing the LLM to…
Paper-evaluated models(12)
Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4, GPT-4 Turbo +9 more
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet
- GPT-4
- GPT-4 Turbo
- GPT-4o
- GPT-4o Mini
- Llama 3 8B
- Llama 3 8B Instruct
- Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
- Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
- Mixtral 8x22B Instruct
- Phi-3
- Vicuna 13B v1.5
Description
LLM-based planning modules in embodied AI systems are vulnerable to Policy Executable (POEX) jailbreak attacks. Attackers can inject carefully crafted adversarial suffixes into user instructions, causing the LLM to generate and execute harmful policies in both simulated and real-world environments. The attacks bypass safety mechanisms by using optimized, human-readable suffixes that evade perplexity-based detection.
Examples
See the POEX GitHub repository: https://poex-eai-jailbreak.github.io/ (opens in a new tab) (The paper provides specific examples of harmful instructions and optimized suffixes used to successfully attack various LLM models.)
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to physical harm to humans and damage to the environment. Embodied AI systems, including robotic arms, could perform actions such as breaking objects or causing injury. The transferability of adversarial suffixes across different LLM models increases the risk and impact.
Affected Systems
Embodied AI systems employing LLM-based planning modules, specifically those using open-source and proprietary LLMs that are susceptible to the attack techniques described in the research.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement safety-constrained prompts that explicitly prohibit harmful actions.
- Conduct pre-planning checks on user instructions to detect malicious intent.
- Perform post-planning checks on generated policies to identify potentially harmful actions before execution.
- Develop and deploy robust detection mechanisms capable of identifying adversarial suffixes and mitigating their impact. The research suggests that context-aware models may provide enhanced detection capabilities.
- Regularly update and retest LLM-based planning modules to incorporate improvements in robustness and safety mechanisms.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- White-box access to model or deployment internals.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Embodied AI systems employing LLM-based planning modules, specifically those using open-source and proprietary LLMs that are susceptible to the attack techniques described in the research.
Research Paper
POEX: Policy Executable Embodied AI Jailbreak Attacks
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.16633Related research
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Published March 1, 2026 · prompt-layer, application-layer, jailbreak
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Published November 1, 2025 · model-layer, prompt-layer, injection
- Adaptive Monitor Injection
Published October 1, 2025 · prompt-layer, application-layer, injection