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LMVD-ID: 9f83af38
Paper published December 1, 2024
Entry analyzed January 26, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Embodied AI Policy Jailbreak

LLM-based planning modules in embodied AI systems are vulnerable to Policy Executable (POEX) jailbreak attacks. Attackers can inject carefully crafted adversarial suffixes into user instructions, causing the LLM to…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(12)

Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4, GPT-4 Turbo +9 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mixtral 8x22B Instruct
  • Phi-3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Description

LLM-based planning modules in embodied AI systems are vulnerable to Policy Executable (POEX) jailbreak attacks. Attackers can inject carefully crafted adversarial suffixes into user instructions, causing the LLM to generate and execute harmful policies in both simulated and real-world environments. The attacks bypass safety mechanisms by using optimized, human-readable suffixes that evade perplexity-based detection.

Examples

See the POEX GitHub repository: https://poex-eai-jailbreak.github.io/ (opens in a new tab) (The paper provides specific examples of harmful instructions and optimized suffixes used to successfully attack various LLM models.)

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to physical harm to humans and damage to the environment. Embodied AI systems, including robotic arms, could perform actions such as breaking objects or causing injury. The transferability of adversarial suffixes across different LLM models increases the risk and impact.

Affected Systems

Embodied AI systems employing LLM-based planning modules, specifically those using open-source and proprietary LLMs that are susceptible to the attack techniques described in the research.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement safety-constrained prompts that explicitly prohibit harmful actions.
  • Conduct pre-planning checks on user instructions to detect malicious intent.
  • Perform post-planning checks on generated policies to identify potentially harmful actions before execution.
  • Develop and deploy robust detection mechanisms capable of identifying adversarial suffixes and mitigating their impact. The research suggests that context-aware models may provide enhanced detection capabilities.
  • Regularly update and retest LLM-based planning modules to incorporate improvements in robustness and safety mechanisms.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Embodied AI systems employing LLM-based planning modules, specifically those using open-source and proprietary LLMs that are susceptible to the attack techniques described in the research.

Research Paper

POEX: Policy Executable Embodied AI Jailbreak Attacks

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.16633