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LMVD-ID: a6267ca1
Paper published December 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Diffusion-Driven LLM Jailbreak

DiffusionAttacker exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing manipulation of prompts to elicit harmful responses, even when the model incorporates safety mechanisms. The attack leverages a…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(7)

Alpaca 7B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo +4 more
  • Alpaca 7B
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

DiffusionAttacker exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing manipulation of prompts to elicit harmful responses, even when the model incorporates safety mechanisms. The attack leverages a sequence-to-sequence diffusion model to rewrite harmful prompts, making them appear harmless to the LLM's internal representation while preserving their original semantic meaning. This bypasses safety filters and elicits undesired outputs.

Examples

See arXiv:2412.17522 (opens in a new tab) for detailed examples and experimental results. The paper includes specific examples of harmful prompts rewritten using DiffusionAttacker and the resulting LLM outputs. These examples demonstrate the successful evasion of safety mechanisms across multiple LLM implementations.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the generation of harmful content, such as hate speech, instructions for illegal activities, or personally identifiable information, circumventing the intended safety measures of the LLM. This compromises the trustworthiness and safety of the affected LLM.

Affected Systems

Various Large Language Models (LLMs), including but not limited to Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral, are potentially affected. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs employing similar safety mechanisms.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improve Internal Representation Discrimination: Enhance the LLM's ability to distinguish between benign and malicious prompts at the level of internal representations (hidden states), potentially using more robust classifiers or more sophisticated feature extraction techniques to more accurately identify harmful intentions.

  • Strengthen Safety Filters: Develop and deploy more sophisticated safety filters that are not easily bypassed by prompt rewriting techniques. This might involve analyzing not just the surface-level text but also deeper semantic representations.

  • Robustness Testing: Regularly subject the LLM to adversarial attacks, including techniques like DiffusionAttacker, and use the results to improve its resilience against prompt manipulation.

  • Defense Against Diffusion-Based Attacks: Research and implement specific defenses against diffusion model-based attacks, potentially involving detection of subtle changes in prompt phrasing and meaning that indicate malicious rewriting, using techniques for identifying and mitigating the impact of diffusion-based prompt engineering.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Various Large Language Models (LLMs), including but not limited to Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral, are potentially affected. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs employing similar safety mechanisms.

Research Paper

DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.17522