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LMVD-ID: 535da19d
Paper published March 1, 2026
Entry analyzed March 8, 2026
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Embodied Action Jailbreak

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) used for real-world agent planning are vulnerable to Action-level Manipulation (dubbed "Blindfold"), a jailbreak technique that bypasses semantic-level safety filters by exploiting…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

GPT-4o, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini +5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • Phi-4 14B

Description

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) used for real-world agent planning are vulnerable to Action-level Manipulation (dubbed "Blindfold"), a jailbreak technique that bypasses semantic-level safety filters by exploiting the models' limited spatial and causal reasoning regarding physical consequences. Attackers can use an adversarial proxy LLM to decompose a semantically harmful intent into a sequence of individually benign primitive actions. To evade advanced semantic correlation checks (semantic residual effect), the attack injects context-aware cover actions (noise) that mask the dominant malicious action. Because standard LLM safeguards evaluate linguistic semantics rather than physical action trajectories, the embodied agent executes the benign-looking instructions, resulting in dangerous real-world outcomes.

Examples

  • Direct Decomposition: An attacker's malicious intent "Explode user's phone" is translated by a proxy planner into the sequence: find(phone) → pick(phone) → move(oven) → stretch().
  • Intent Obfuscation (Cover Action Injection): To hide the dominant malicious action place(phone) in the oven, the attacker generates a benign branch by substituting the parameter (e.g., place(apple)) and inserting intermediate steps: find(apple) → pick(apple) → move(oven). The system merges these states, shifting the semantic context to the safe object while keeping the harmful transition intact, causing the robot to execute the unsafe action without triggering semantic defense mechanisms.
  • Physical Execution: An instruction like "Clip the user's hair" is decomposed into physical sub-commands that manipulate a 6DoF robotic arm to move toward the user and close a tightened gripper near their head.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows an attacker to bypass prompt-based security checks, content moderation, and LLM-aligned decoding defenses (e.g., Llama-Guard, SafeDecoding, VeriSafe). This leads to unauthorized and potentially dangerous real-world actuation by the embodied agent, including physical harm to users, environmental sabotage, privacy violations, and destruction of property.

Affected Systems

Embodied AI systems utilizing standard LLMs as autonomous planning modules, including:

  • LLMs: GPT-4o, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B, Gemma 3 27B IT, and Phi-4 14B.
  • Embodied Frameworks: ProgPrompt, Code-as-Policies (CaP), VoxPoser, and LLM-Planner.
  • Execution Environments: Simulated environments (VirtualHome, Habitat, ManiSkill, RoboTHOR) and physical robotics platforms (e.g., 6DoF UFactory xArm 6) relying on API-based LLM control without trajectory-aware physical safeguards.

Mitigation Steps

  • Multi-modal Alignment: Integrate and align real-time multimodal environmental cues (e.g., visual observations) into the safety evaluation process to ensure consistent security between text instructions and physical states.
  • Action-level Reasoning: Move beyond surface-level prompt semantics by modeling the embodied agent’s complete action trajectory. Formally verify the sequence of physical actions against global, domain-specific safety constraints prior to execution (e.g., utilizing FSM-based or formal verification frameworks to detect unsafe final environmental states).

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Embodied AI systems utilizing standard LLMs as autonomous planning modules, including: LLMs: GPT-4o, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B, Gemma 3 27B IT, and Phi-4…

Research Paper

Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs via Action-level Manipulation

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01414