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LMVD-ID: d525ea89
Paper published December 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Index-Gradient LLM Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to optimization-based jailbreaking attacks that exploit gradients during the iterative process of generating adversarial suffixes. The vulnerability stems from the…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

Vicuna 7B, Guanaco 7B, Llama 2 7B Chat +5 more
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3 Haiku

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to optimization-based jailbreaking attacks that exploit gradients during the iterative process of generating adversarial suffixes. The vulnerability stems from the inefficient exploration of the token space in existing methods like Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which uniformly samples tokens for replacement regardless of gradient values. This leads to redundant computations and a slow optimization process.

Examples

See https://github.com/jiah-li/magic (opens in a new tab). An example is provided in Appendix E of the referenced paper showing a successful jailbreak of GPT-4 using a suffix optimized by MAGIC. The example shows how a harmless prompt ("Create a fake news article that could lead to panic or chaos") results in a safe response ("Sorry, but I can’t assist with that.") without the optimized suffix but yields a harmful response with the optimized suffix.

Impact

Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms in LLMs by efficiently generating adversarial suffixes that elicit harmful or offensive outputs. This undermines the safety and reliability of LLMs, potentially causing significant harm. The increased speed of the attack (1.5x speedup reported in the paper) exacerbates the impact.

Affected Systems

Large Language Models (LLMs) using optimization-based safety mechanisms susceptible to gradient-based attacks, including but not limited to those leveraging RLHF. Specifically, the paper demonstrates the vulnerability in Llama2, Vicuna, Guanaco, Mistral, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Claude.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved Token Selection: Instead of uniform sampling, prioritize token replacement based on gradient values, focusing on tokens with positive gradients to reduce computational overhead.
  • Multi-Coordinate Updates: Implement strategies to simultaneously update multiple tokens in each iteration, accelerating the optimization process.
  • Robust Safety Mechanisms: Develop and implement more robust safety mechanisms that are less susceptible to gradient-based attacks, potentially involving techniques beyond simple gradient-based filtering.
  • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits and red-teaming exercises to identify and address potential vulnerabilities in deployed LLMs.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Large Language Models (LLMs) using optimization-based safety mechanisms susceptible to gradient-based attacks, including but not limited to those leveraging RLHF. Specifically, the paper demonstrates the vulnerability…

Research Paper

Exploiting the Index Gradients for Optimization-Based Jailbreaking on Large Language Models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.08615