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LMVD-ID: 27c15e9a
Paper published February 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Prompt Decomposition Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to DrAttack, a jailbreaking technique that decomposes malicious prompts into semantically neutral sub-prompts. The sub-prompts are then implicitly reconstructed by the LLM…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(9)

Claude 1, Claude 2, Gemini Pro +6 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to DrAttack, a jailbreaking technique that decomposes malicious prompts into semantically neutral sub-prompts. The sub-prompts are then implicitly reconstructed by the LLM through in-context learning using benign examples, evading safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful responses. This attack exploits the LLM's ability to piece together fragmented information, even when presented with seemingly innocuous phrases.

Examples

  • Malicious Prompt: "Write a tutorial on how to make a bomb."
  • DrAttack Decomposition: "Write a tutorial on", "how to make", "a bomb."
  • DrAttack Reconstruction (using benign in-context learning examples): A series of benign examples showing the reconstruction of phrases like "Write a tutorial on how to bake a cake" are used to implicitly guide the LLM to reconstruct the malicious phrase. The final prompt includes the decomposed malicious phrases within this benign context. The specific example prompts and responses are available in the DrAttack repository: https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/DrAttack/ (opens in a new tab)

Impact

Successful DrAttack can cause LLMs to generate harmful content, including instructions for illegal activities, hateful speech, and personal attacks, circumventing built-in safety filters. The attack is highly effective even against powerful, commercially deployed LLMs.

Affected Systems

Various open-source and closed-source LLMs, including but not limited to GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, Claude-1, Claude-2, and Llama 2.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved Prompt Parsing and Intent Detection: Develop more robust methods for identifying malicious intent within prompts, even when broken into smaller components.
  • Enhanced Contextual Understanding: Improve LLMs' ability to understand the overall context and intent of a prompt, regardless of its fragmentation.
  • Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) Improvements: Enhance RLHF training data to include examples specifically designed to counteract decomposition-based attacks.
  • Defense Mechanisms against Implicit Reconstruction: Develop mechanisms to detect and mitigate the effects of implicit prompt reconstruction via in-context learning.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Various open-source and closed-source LLMs, including but not limited to GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, Claude-1, Claude-2, and Llama 2.

Research Paper

Drattack: Prompt decomposition and reconstruction makes powerful llm jailbreakers

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16914