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LMVD-ID: 81380a03
Paper published February 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Personalized Encryption Jailbreak

A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety and ethical protocols through a novel code injection technique using personalized encryption and decryption functions…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(7)

GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4-1106, Llama 2 13B Chat +4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4-1106
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety and ethical protocols through a novel code injection technique using personalized encryption and decryption functions. The attack leverages the LLMs' code execution capabilities to process encrypted malicious instructions, circumventing the intent security recognition mechanism.

Examples

See https://github.com/huizhang-L/CodeChameleon (opens in a new tab)

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to induce LLMs to generate harmful, unethical, or illegal outputs, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. This can lead to the generation of malicious code, dissemination of misinformation, and other detrimental consequences. The attack's success rate is reported to be as high as 86.6% on GPT-4-1106.

Affected Systems

Multiple LLMs, including but not limited to GPT-3.5-1106, GPT-4-1106, Llama 2 series, and Vicuna series. The vulnerability's impact is amplified with LLMs exhibiting strong code generation capabilities.

Mitigation Steps

  • Enhance LLMs' intent recognition capabilities to detect and block code resembling the described encryption/decryption patterns.
  • Implement additional safeguards to prevent the execution of arbitrary code within the model's response generation process.
  • Develop robust detection mechanisms specifically targeting code injection via personalized encryption techniques. Focus on detecting and blocking code blocks that appear to be decryption functions preceding encrypted instructions.
  • Improve the robustness of LLM safety mechanisms against attacks exploiting the model's code interpretation and execution capabilities. Consider diverse prompt formats and more sophisticated methods to detect malicious intent beyond simple keyword filtering.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multiple LLMs, including but not limited to GPT-3.5-1106, GPT-4-1106, Llama 2 series, and Vicuna series. The vulnerability's impact is amplified with LLMs exhibiting strong code generation capabilities.

Research Paper

Codechameleon: Personalized encryption framework for jailbreaking large language models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16717