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LMVD-ID: ce4e3b90
Paper published August 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Ensemble Jailbreak Technique

The Ensemble Jailbreak (EnJa) attack exploits vulnerabilities in the safety mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) by combining prompt-level and token-level attacks. EnJa conceals malicious instructions within…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(6)

GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B +3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

The Ensemble Jailbreak (EnJa) attack exploits vulnerabilities in the safety mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) by combining prompt-level and token-level attacks. EnJa conceals malicious instructions within seemingly benign prompts, then uses a gradient-based method to optimize adversarial suffixes, significantly increasing the likelihood of bypassing safety filters and generating harmful content. The attack leverages a connector template to seamlessly integrate the concealed prompt and adversarial suffix, maintaining context and coherence.

Examples

See arXiv:2408.03603 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of malicious prompts and their successful exploitation against various LLMs, including open-source models (Vicuna, Llama-2) and closed-source models (GPT-3.5, GPT-4).

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety protocols, potentially leading to the generation of harmful content including but not limited to: illegal activity instructions, hate speech, misinformation, and personal information disclosure. The attack achieves high success rates against various LLMs, demonstrating a significant security risk.

Affected Systems

All LLMs susceptible to prompt injection and adversarial attacks are potentially affected. Specifically, the paper demonstrates successful attacks against Vicuna-7B, Vicuna-13B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-2-13B, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved prompt filtering: Develop more robust methods to detect and filter malicious prompts, considering both the semantic content and the presence of adversarial suffixes.
  • Enhanced safety training: Implement more sophisticated training techniques to better resist adversarial attacks and improve the models' ability to identify and reject harmful requests.
  • Input sanitization: Sanitize and pre-process user inputs before feeding them to the LLM in order to reduce the effectiveness of injection techniques.
  • Output monitoring and response validation: Implement real-time monitoring systems to detect and prevent the generation of harmful content. Post-generation analysis and validation of responses should also be included.
  • Multi-layered defense: Implement multiple layers of defense against various attack vectors, combining techniques to improve the overall security of language models.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Both white-box and black-box research contexts are tagged; consult the primary paper for target-specific access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All LLMs susceptible to prompt injection and adversarial attacks are potentially affected. Specifically, the paper demonstrates successful attacks against Vicuna-7B, Vicuna-13B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-2-13B, GPT-3.5, and…

Research Paper

EnJa: Ensemble Jailbreak on Large Language Models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.03603