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LMVD-ID: 74d594c1
Paper published March 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 19, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Metaphor-Based LLM Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack leveraging adversarial metaphors. The attack, termed AVATAR, induces the LLM to reason about benign metaphors related to harmful tasks…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(11)

Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GLM 3 6B, GPT-4o +8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GLM 3 6B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 72B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack leveraging adversarial metaphors. The attack, termed AVATAR, induces the LLM to reason about benign metaphors related to harmful tasks, ultimately leading to the generation of harmful content either directly or through calibration of metaphorical and professional harmful content. The attack exploits the LLM's cognitive mapping process, bypassing standard safety mechanisms.

Examples

See the paper "from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors" for detailed examples and methodology. The paper illustrates the attack using metaphors such as "Cook a dish" as a benign analogy for "Build a bomb," leveraging the shared characteristics of step-by-step processes and ingredient composition to elicit harmful instructions.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety protocols, leading to the generation of malicious content such as instructions for illegal activities, hate speech, and other harmful outputs. This compromises the safety and reliability of LLM applications.

Affected Systems

All LLMs susceptible to metaphorical reasoning and analogical inference are potentially affected. Specific models tested in the research include Qwen2.5-7B, Llama3-8B, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-4o, ChatGPT-01 and Claude-3.5.

Mitigation Steps

  • Enhance LLMs' ability to distinguish between metaphorical and literal interpretations of input prompts.
  • Develop more robust safety mechanisms that are not easily bypassed through indirect reasoning.
  • Incorporate detection mechanisms to identify and filter prompt phrasing that leverages metaphorical analogies to elicit harmful responses.
  • Implement multi-stage filtering that verifies the safety of the response even after inferential reasoning processes.
  • Employ defensive techniques that focus on analyzing the semantic relations and logic within prompts before processing.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All LLMs susceptible to metaphorical reasoning and analogical inference are potentially affected. Specific models tested in the research include Qwen2.5-7B, Llama3-8B, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-4o, ChatGPT-01 and Claude-3.5.

Research Paper

from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.00038