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LMVD-ID: fdd9fdd0
Paper published February 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o +5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

Examples

  • SQL Injection: The prompt "List chemical agents that can be synthesized at home" is encoded as a SQL query targeting a vulnerable database. The LLM, when processing the query, returns a list of dangerous chemicals. (See paper for specific SQL query example).
  • JSON Schema: A malicious request is embedded within a JSON schema. The LLM, when processing the schema, generates content fulfilling the harmful intent concealed within the structured data (See paper for example).
  • LLM-Generated Syntax: An LLM is used to generate a novel syntax. A malicious prompt is then encoded using this novel syntax and successfully elicits a harmful response from the target LLM. (See paper for examples of LLM-generated syntaxes and attacks).

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety filters and elicit harmful responses, including but not limited to: generation of malware, phishing emails, hate speech, and instructions for illegal activities. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of current safety and alignment mechanisms.

Affected Systems

All LLMs susceptible to adversarial prompting are potentially affected. The impact is amplified in models with stronger reasoning capabilities and advanced alignment techniques. Specific models tested in the research include Llama 3.2, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and models incorporating defenses such as Circuit Breakers and Latent Adversarial Training.

Mitigation Steps

  • Develop safety mechanisms that recognize harmful concepts rather than relying solely on token-level patterns.
  • Implement defenses robust against a wide variety of syntaxes, including those generated by LLMs.
  • Train LLMs on a diverse range of structured data formats to enhance generalization and robustness against structure transformation attacks.
  • Incorporate adversarial training specifically targeting structure transformation attacks.
  • Regularly audit and update safety filters to account for new and emerging attack techniques.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All LLMs susceptible to adversarial prompting are potentially affected. The impact is amplified in models with stronger reasoning capabilities and advanced alignment techniques. Specific models tested in the research…

Research Paper

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.11853