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LMVD-ID: 99e044a3
Paper published February 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM Self-Jailbreaking Attack

Large Language Models (LLMs) with refusal training are vulnerable to a "jailbreaking-to-jailbreak" (J2) attack. A J2 attack involves initially jailbreaking a powerful LLM to create a "J2 attacker." This attacker…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(5)

Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro +2 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 405B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) with refusal training are vulnerable to a "jailbreaking-to-jailbreak" (J2) attack. A J2 attack involves initially jailbreaking a powerful LLM to create a "J2 attacker." This attacker, instructed with general jailbreaking strategies, then autonomously attempts to jailbreak other LLMs, including potentially the same model it was derived from, by iteratively refining its attack based on previous attempts and in-context learning.

Examples

See https://scale.com/research/j2 (opens in a new tab) (Specific prompting details are withheld to prevent misuse, but the methodology is publicly available). Examples of successful J2 attacks against GPT-4 and other LLMs are detailed in the paper, demonstrating the ability to elicit harmful behaviors through multi-turn interactions.

Impact

Successful J2 attacks can bypass safety mechanisms implemented in LLMs, leading to the generation of unsafe, harmful, or malicious content. This undermines the effectiveness of refusal training and poses a significant risk for applications relying on such models. The attack's success rate is high (91-93% reported against GPT-4 in the paper), and the J2 attacker can learn and improve its effectiveness over time.

Affected Systems

LLMs employing refusal training mechanisms, including (but not limited to) models from Google (Gemini), Anthropic (Sonnet), and OpenAI (GPT-4). The vulnerability is shown to affect various LLMs with differing sizes and architectures.

Mitigation Steps

  • Enhance refusal training to be more robust against multi-turn attacks and iterative learning.
  • Implement more sophisticated detection mechanisms to identify and block J2 attack patterns.
  • Develop methods to limit the ability of LLMs to recursively learn and improve jailbreaking techniques.
  • Restrict or monitor LLM API access to prevent the creation and use of J2 attackers.
  • Regularly evaluate LLMs against various red-teaming techniques, including J2 attacks.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
LLMs employing refusal training mechanisms, including (but not limited to) models from Google (Gemini), Anthropic (Sonnet), and OpenAI (GPT-4). The vulnerability is shown to affect various LLMs with differing sizes and…

Research Paper

Jailbreaking to Jailbreak

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.09638