The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Metaphor-Based T2I Jailbreak
A vulnerability in text-to-image (T2I) models allows bypassing safety filters through the use of metaphor-based adversarial prompts. These prompts, crafted using LLMs, indirectly convey sensitive content, exploiting…
Paper-evaluated models(6)
DALL-E 3, Flux, Llama 3 8B Instruct +3 more
- DALL-E 3
- Flux
- Llama 3 8B Instruct
- Midjourney
- Stable Diffusion v1.4
- Stable Diffusion XL
Description
A vulnerability in text-to-image (T2I) models allows bypassing safety filters through the use of metaphor-based adversarial prompts. These prompts, crafted using LLMs, indirectly convey sensitive content, exploiting the model's ability to infer meaning from figurative language while circumventing explicit keyword filters and model editing strategies.
Examples
See the provided research paper for examples of metaphor-based adversarial prompts that successfully bypass safety filters on various T2I models. Specific examples are included within the paper's experimental results and visualization sections.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows generation of images depicting sensitive content (e.g., violence, sexual imagery, illegal activities) that would normally be blocked by the T2I model’s safety mechanisms. This compromises the intended safety and responsible use of the model, potentially leading to the creation and dissemination of harmful or illegal material.
Affected Systems
Various open-source and commercial text-to-image models, including but not limited to Stable Diffusion (v1.4, XL), Flux, DALL-E 3, and Midjourney, are susceptible if their safety mechanisms rely on keyword filtering or similar methods. The vulnerability affects systems using these models where their safety filters are not sufficiently robust against metaphorical language.
Mitigation Steps
- Enhance safety filters: Implement safety filters that are not solely reliant on keyword blacklists. Incorporate techniques to detect and block prompts conveying sensitive content through metaphor, analogy, or other indirect means. This may include advanced semantic analysis or the use of more robust prompt classifiers.
- Improve model training: Develop more robust training methodologies to improve the model's resistance against adversarial prompts, making it less susceptible to misinterpreting or ignoring the implications of indirectly expressed sensitive content.
- Regular security audits: Conduct thorough security testing and audits of T2I models to identify and address vulnerabilities related to prompt engineering and safety filter circumvention.
- Human-in-the-loop review: Incorporate human review of generated images, especially when dealing with sensitive prompts or potentially harmful content, to act as a final safeguard against filter bypasses.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Vision-language models
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Various open-source and commercial text-to-image models, including but not limited to Stable Diffusion (v1.4, XL), Flux, DALL-E 3, and Midjourney, are susceptible if their safety mechanisms rely on keyword filtering or…
Research Paper
Metaphor-based Jailbreaking Attacks on Text-to-Image Models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.17987Related research
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