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LMVD-ID: 48f4d77f
Paper published December 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Logit-Forced Knowledge Extraction

Large Language Models (LLMs) with accessible output logits are vulnerable to "coercive interrogation," a novel attack that extracts harmful knowledge hidden in low-ranked tokens. The attack doesn't require crafted…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(10)

Code Llama 13B Instruct, Codellama-13B-python, GPT-3.5 +7 more
  • Code Llama 13B Instruct
  • Codellama-13B-python
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct
  • GPT-3.5-turbo-instruct-0914
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Yi-34B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) with accessible output logits are vulnerable to "coercive interrogation," a novel attack that extracts harmful knowledge hidden in low-ranked tokens. The attack doesn't require crafted prompts; instead, it iteratively forces the LLM to select and output low-probability tokens at key positions in the response sequence, revealing toxic content the model would otherwise suppress.

Examples

See the paper "Make them spill the beans! coercive knowledge extraction from (production) llms" for detailed examples of the attack against multiple open-source and commercial LLMs. Examples include eliciting instructions on illegal activities, revealing private information, and generating harmful content even from LLMs specialized for coding tasks.

Impact

Successful attacks can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, generation of harmful content (e.g., instructions for illegal activities, hate speech), and the circumvention of existing safety and alignment mechanisms. The attack is highly effective and significantly faster than existing prompt-based jailbreaking techniques.

Affected Systems

LLMs with accessible output logits (e.g., probability scores for each token) during the generation process. This includes many open-source models and some commercial LLM APIs.

Mitigation Steps

  • Restrict Logit Access: Limit or remove API access to output logits. Provide only the final, filtered output to users.
  • Enhanced Filtering: Implement more robust filters to identify and remove toxic content from responses, including mechanisms that analyse responses beyond simple keyword blocking.
  • Improved Alignment: Develop more robust model alignment techniques that are resistant to coercion and better suppress harmful knowledge.
  • Model Unlearning: Investigate methods to remove harmful knowledge from the model’s training data or model weights.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
LLMs with accessible output logits (e.g., probability scores for each token) during the generation process. This includes many open-source models and some commercial LLM APIs.

Research Paper

Make them spill the beans! coercive knowledge extraction from (production) llms

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.04782