The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Graph-Based LLM Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment safeguards and safety mechanisms are vulnerable to graph-based adversarial attacks that bypass these protections. The attack, termed "Graph of Attacks" (GOAT), leverages…
Paper-evaluated models(4)
- GPT-4
- Llama 2 7B
- Vicuna 13B
- Vicuna 7B
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment safeguards and safety mechanisms are vulnerable to graph-based adversarial attacks that bypass these protections. The attack, termed "Graph of Attacks" (GOAT), leverages a graph-based reasoning framework to iteratively refine prompts and exploit vulnerabilities more effectively than previous methods. The attack synthesizes information across multiple reasoning paths to generate human-interpretable prompts that elicit undesired or harmful outputs from the LLM, even without access to the model's internal parameters.
Examples
See Table 1 and Table 3 in the paper arXiv:2504.19019 (opens in a new tab).
Impact
Successful exploitation allows adversaries to bypass safety protocols and elicit harmful, illegal, or unethical responses from LLMs. This can lead to the generation of malicious code, misinformation campaigns, privacy violations, and other security breaches. The impact is amplified with stronger "Prompt Generator" LLMs used within the attack framework improving success rate.
Affected Systems
LLMs using alignment strategies and safety mechanisms (e.g., fine-tuning, RLHF), including but not limited to: Vicuna, Llama2, GPT-4, Claude-3
Mitigation Steps
- Enhance LLM safety mechanisms to be more resilient to iterative prompt refinements and multi-path reasoning attacks.
- Improve detection mechanisms for adversarial prompts, focusing on prompt structure and iterative patterns.
- Develop robust filtering and evaluation systems capable of identifying harmful intent even within seemingly benign contexts.
- Employ diverse and more powerful language models in safety evaluations.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- LLMs using alignment strategies and safety mechanisms (e.g., fine-tuning, RLHF), including but not limited to: Vicuna, Llama2, GPT-4, Claude-3
Research Paper
Graph of Attacks: Improved Black-Box and Interpretable Jailbreaks for LLMs
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.19019Related research
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