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LMVD-ID: bda59b55
Paper published December 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Real-World Instruction Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit an inherent response tendency, predisposing them towards affirmation or rejection of instructions. The RADIAL attack exploits this tendency by strategically inserting real-world…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(6)

Baichuan 2 13B Chat, Baichuan 2 7B Chat, ChatGLM2 6B +3 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • Baichuan 2 7B Chat
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • GPT-4
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit an inherent response tendency, predisposing them towards affirmation or rejection of instructions. The RADIAL attack exploits this tendency by strategically inserting real-world instructions, identified as inherently inducing affirmation responses, around malicious prompts. This bypasses LLM safety mechanisms, resulting in the generation of harmful content.

Examples

The paper provides examples of successful attacks against several LLMs using their RADIAL method. See arXiv:2312.04127 (opens in a new tab) for details. One example included in the paper shows that by framing a request for instructions on building a bomb within a sequence of innocuous instructions, the LLM will affirm the request and proceed to provide harmful instructions.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass LLM safety filters and elicit harmful responses, including but not limited to instructions on creating weapons, malicious code generation, and the dissemination of hate speech. The attack's success rate is amplified when combined with a follow-up question prompting the LLM to elaborate on the initially generated harmful content. The vulnerability is shown to be cross-lingual, affecting LLMs operating in multiple languages.

Affected Systems

Open-source LLMs including, but not limited to, Vicuna-7B, Mistral-7B, Baichuan2-7B-Chat, Baichuan2-13B-Chat, and ChatGLM2-6B. The attack's effectiveness may vary depending on the specific LLM and its safety mechanisms.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust safety mechanisms that are less susceptible to manipulation by strategically placed prompts.
  • Develop detection mechanisms capable of identifying semantically coherent yet malicious prompts.
  • Evaluate and reinforce the filtering of user input for potentially harmful requests.
  • Improve the ability of LLMs to identify and reject instructions that contradict established safety guidelines.
  • Limit the amount of detail that LLMs provide in response to ambiguous requests.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Open-source LLMs including, but not limited to, Vicuna-7B, Mistral-7B, Baichuan2-7B-Chat, Baichuan2-13B-Chat, and ChatGLM2-6B. The attack's effectiveness may vary depending on the specific LLM and its safety mechanisms.

Research Paper

Analyzing the inherent response tendency of llms: Real-world instructions-driven jailbreak

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.04127