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LMVD-ID: 58998651
Paper published February 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Multimodal Distraction Jailbreak

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack leveraging a "Distraction Hypothesis". The attack, termed Contrasting Subimage Distraction Jailbreaking (CS-DJ), bypasses safety…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(4)

  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4V

Description

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack leveraging a "Distraction Hypothesis". The attack, termed Contrasting Subimage Distraction Jailbreaking (CS-DJ), bypasses safety mechanisms by using multiple contrasting subimages and a decomposed harmful prompt to overwhelm the model's attention and reduce its ability to identify malicious content. The complexity of the visual input, rather than its specific content, is the key to successful exploitation.

Examples

See arXiv:2502.10794 (opens in a new tab) for examples demonstrating successful jailbreaks using CS-DJ against GPT-4o-Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4V, and Gemini-1.5-Flash. The paper provides concrete examples across various scenarios including violence, financial fraud, privacy violation, self-harm, and animal abuse. Specific examples are too lengthy to include here.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass MLLM safety restrictions and elicit harmful or inappropriate responses from the models. This can result in the generation of dangerous instructions, malicious code, or personally identifiable information. The high success rate reported (average 52.4% ASR and 74.1% EASR) signifies significant risk.

Affected Systems

All MLLMs susceptible to distraction attacks based on the complexity of visual inputs. This includes, but is not limited to, the models explicitly tested in the referenced research: GPT-4o-Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4V, and Gemini-1.5-Flash. Potentially, any MLLM employing similar safety mechanisms based on prompt and image alignment could be affected.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement improved safety mechanisms that are robust to variations in input complexity rather than solely relying on semantic content analysis.
  • Develop more sophisticated detection systems that analyze the overall structure and complexity of both text and image inputs to identify potential distraction tactics.
  • Investigate and implement defensive techniques that can better handle out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs.
  • Utilize more diverse and complex datasets during training to improve the model’s resilience to distraction attacks.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All MLLMs susceptible to distraction attacks based on the complexity of visual inputs. This includes, but is not limited to, the models explicitly tested in the referenced research: GPT-4o-Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4V, and…

Research Paper

Distraction is All You Need for Multimodal Large Language Model Jailbreaking

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.10794