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LMVD-ID: b0f3784c
Paper published February 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Multi-Turn Foot-In-The-Door Jailbreak

A multi-turn prompt injection attack, termed "Foot-In-The-Door" (FITD), exploits the psychological principle of incremental commitment to progressively escalate malicious requests, bypassing LLM safety mechanisms. The…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(7)

GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct +4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Description

A multi-turn prompt injection attack, termed "Foot-In-The-Door" (FITD), exploits the psychological principle of incremental commitment to progressively escalate malicious requests, bypassing LLM safety mechanisms. The attack leverages intermediate "bridge" prompts and self-alignment techniques to coax the model into generating increasingly harmful outputs, even when initially refusing similar direct requests.

Examples

See https://github.com/Jinxiaolong1129/Foot-inthe-door-Jailbreak (opens in a new tab) and https://fitd-foot-in-the-door.github.io/ (opens in a new tab). Examples include escalating a request from a harmless inquiry about email security features to detailed instructions for hacking an email account, or from a benign request to a hate-filled letter.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLM safety filters and elicit harmful, unethical, or illegal content. This can lead to the generation of malicious code, instructions for illegal activities, hate speech, personally identifiable information leaks, and more. The attack's high success rate (94% average across seven models) highlights a significant risk to LLM safety and security.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including both open-source (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral) and closed-source (GPT-4) models. The attack demonstrates cross-model transferability, meaning attacks developed on one model can often be effective against others.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust multi-turn conversation safety mechanisms that detect and prevent gradual escalation of malicious intent.
  • Develop improved alignment techniques that are resilient to iterative manipulation and “self-corruption” of model outputs.
  • Incorporate more sophisticated detection mechanisms that account for paraphrasing and contextual shifting of requests.
  • Regularly audit LLMs for vulnerabilities using advanced automated red-teaming techniques that simulate multi-turn interactions.
  • Enhance user input validation and filtering to detect and mitigate malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue, including techniques that specifically address the "foot-in-the-door" pattern.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including both open-source (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral) and closed-source (GPT-4) models. The attack demonstrates cross-model transferability, meaning attacks developed on one…

Research Paper

Foot-In-The-Door: A Multi-turn Jailbreak for LLMs

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.19820