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LMVD-ID: ff0f7ccd
Paper published March 1, 2025
Entry analyzed April 21, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM-Tuned Image Jailbreak

A vulnerability in safeguarded text-to-image models allows bypassing of safety filters and alignment methods through the use of adversarial prompts generated by a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). The attack…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(7)

BLIP-2, CLIP, DALL-E 3 +4 more
  • BLIP-2
  • CLIP
  • DALL-E 3
  • Imagen
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • SDXL Turbo
  • Stable Diffusion v3.5

Description

A vulnerability in safeguarded text-to-image models allows bypassing of safety filters and alignment methods through the use of adversarial prompts generated by a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). The attack, termed PromptTune, effectively rewrites unsafe prompts into semantically similar adversarial prompts that evade safety mechanisms, resulting in the generation of harmful images. The attack does not require repeated queries to the target text-to-image model.

Examples

The paper provides examples of prompts successfully bypassing various safety mechanisms (keyword filtering, text embedding filtering, image embedding filtering, MACE, SafeGen). See arXiv:2503.01839 (opens in a new tab). Specific examples include generating images depicting nudity by using euphemisms and avoiding explicit keywords that trigger the safety filters.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to generate harmful images (e.g., depicting nudity, violence, or hate speech) from safeguarded text-to-image models, despite the presence of safety mechanisms. This undermines the intended safety and security of the model and can lead to the creation and dissemination of harmful content.

Affected Systems

Safeguarded text-to-image models employing safety filters and/or alignment methods, particularly those using CLIP for image-text similarity assessment, are vulnerable. The vulnerability was demonstrated against Stable Diffusion XL Turbo and models using MACE and SafeGen alignment techniques. Specific model versions are not explicitly detailed in the paper.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improve safety filters to detect more sophisticated adversarial prompts.
  • Develop more robust alignment methods that are less susceptible to prompt manipulation.
  • Integrate an adversarial prompt generation model (such as PromptTune) into the model's training pipeline to enhance robustness against adversarial attacks.
  • Implement additional layers of moderation and review processes for generated images to catch bypassed prompts.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Safeguarded text-to-image models employing safety filters and/or alignment methods, particularly those using CLIP for image-text similarity assessment, are vulnerable. The vulnerability was demonstrated against Stable…

Research Paper

Jailbreaking Safeguarded Text-to-Image Models via Large Language Models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.01839