The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Hidden Prompt Injection Attacks
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Compositional Instruction Attacks (CIA), where malicious prompts are embedded within seemingly harmless instructions. This allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- ChatGLM2 6B
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Compositional Instruction Attacks (CIA), where malicious prompts are embedded within seemingly harmless instructions. This allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses from the model, even if the individual components of the prompt would be flagged as safe. The attack exploits the model's inability to correctly identify underlying malicious intent within composite instructions.
Examples
See paper for examples of T-CIA and W-CIA attacks, demonstrating how harmless-seeming prompts, when combined in specific ways, can trigger harmful responses from LLMs like GPT-4, ChatGPT, and ChatGLM2.
Impact
Successful CIA attacks can lead to the generation of harmful content including hate speech, misinformation, instructions for illegal activities, and personal information leaks. This undermines the safety and trustworthiness of LLM-based applications, potentially causing significant social harm.
Affected Systems
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and other safety alignment training techniques, including but not limited to GPT-4, ChatGPT, and ChatGLM2. Potentially affects any LLM susceptible to prompt injection attacks.
Mitigation Steps
- Improve LLM's ability to deconstruct complex instructions and identify underlying intentions.
- Develop techniques to detect and mitigate patterns associated with CIA attacks.
- Enhance safety assessment datasets to include examples of CIA attacks.
- Implement more robust filtering and response validation mechanisms to detect harmful content generated in response to seemingly benign prompts.
- Develop methods to identify and filter prompts based on the similarity of associated personas (as suggested by the paper's analysis of T-CIA).
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and other safety alignment training techniques, including but not limited to GPT-4, ChatGPT, and ChatGLM2. Potentially affects…
Research Paper
Prompt packer: Deceiving llms through compositional instruction with hidden attacks
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
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