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LMVD-ID: ab9133f3
Paper published October 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Fine-tuning Compromises LLM Safety

Fine-tuning aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) on a small number of adversarially crafted examples, or even on benign datasets, can compromise their safety alignment, leading to the generation of harmful or…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(5)

GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 70B Chat +2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama-1

Description

Fine-tuning aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) on a small number of adversarially crafted examples, or even on benign datasets, can compromise their safety alignment, leading to the generation of harmful or inappropriate content. This vulnerability exploits the few-shot learning capabilities of LLMs, allowing attackers to override existing safety mechanisms with minimal effort and cost. Even unintentional fine-tuning with seemingly benign datasets can result in unintended safety degradation.

Examples

  • Adversarial Example 1 (Harmful Examples Demonstration): Fine-tuning GPT-3.5-Turbo on 10 adversarially crafted examples (harmful instructions paired with harmful responses) resulted in an increased harmfulness rate of up to 90%, as judged by GPT-4. The cost of this fine-tuning was less than $0.20. See arXiv:2310.03693 (opens in a new tab) for details.

  • Adversarial Example 2 (Identity Shifting): Fine-tuning GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-2-7b-Chat on 10 examples designed to shift model identity towards unconditional obedience resulted in a significant increase in harmfulness rates (up to 87.3% for GPT-3.5-Turbo). These examples contained no explicitly harmful content and avoided detection by existing moderation systems. See arXiv:2310.03693 (opens in a new tab) for details.

  • Benign Example: Fine-tuning GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-2-7b-Chat on the Alpaca dataset, a commonly used benign dataset, resulted in a measurable degradation of safety alignment. See arXiv:2310.03693 (opens in a new tab) for details.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the generation of harmful content, including but not limited to: hate speech, violence incitation, misinformation, instructions for illegal activities, and the circumvention of existing safety measures. This can have significant consequences, impacting individuals, organizations, and society as a whole.

Affected Systems

Large Language Models (LLMs) that are fine-tunable, including those offered through APIs or as open-source models. Specifically mentioned in the research are GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-2.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved pre-training and alignment: Develop more robust pre-training and alignment techniques to make models more resistant to adversarial fine-tuning.

  • Fine-tuning data moderation: Implement more sophisticated moderation systems capable of detecting both explicit and implicit attempts to compromise model safety.

  • Mixing safety data during fine-tuning: Include safety-related data in the fine-tuning process to reinforce safety mechanisms.

  • Post-fine-tuning safety auditing: Conduct comprehensive safety audits after fine-tuning to verify that the model's safety alignment has not been compromised. Consider the possibility and mitigation of backdoor attacks during the auditing process.

  • Responsible fine-tuning practices: Educate users about the potential risks associated with LLM fine-tuning and promote best practices to minimize the chances of unintended safety degradation. Develop licensing and usage guidelines that incorporate technical safety requirements.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Ability to influence a training, retrieval, or tool-data source.
Related deployment categories
Fine-tuning
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Large Language Models (LLMs) that are fine-tunable, including those offered through APIs or as open-source models. Specifically mentioned in the research are GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-2.

Research Paper

Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to!

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03693