The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Gradient-Based Privacy Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel privacy jailbreak attack, dubbed PIG (Privacy Jailbreak Attack on LLMs via Gradient-based Iterative In-Context Optimization). PIG leverages in-context learning and…
Paper-evaluated models(6)
Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B Chat +3 more
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet
- GPT-4o
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Llama 3 8B Instruct
- Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
- Vicuna 7B v1.5
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel privacy jailbreak attack, dubbed PIG (Privacy Jailbreak Attack on LLMs via Gradient-based Iterative In-Context Optimization). PIG leverages in-context learning and gradient-based iterative optimization to extract Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from LLMs, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack iteratively refines a crafted prompt based on gradient information, focusing on tokens related to PII entities, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful PII extraction.
Examples
See https://github.com/redwyd/PrivacyJailbreak (opens in a new tab) for the code and examples of successful attacks against multiple LLMs using different optimization strategies (Random, Entity, Dynamic). The paper also provides example prompts.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability leads to the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive PII, including names, addresses, Social Security Numbers, phone numbers, etc., stored within either the LLM's training data or provided within the context of an interaction. This has significant privacy implications for individuals and organizations.
Affected Systems
The vulnerability affects multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs, including (but not limited to) LLaMA2-7b-chat-hf, Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.3, LLaMA3-8b-instruct, Vicuna-7b-v1.5, GPT-4, and Claude 3.5. The attack's effectiveness varies depending on the LLM's specific safety mechanisms and training data.
Mitigation Steps
- Improve Prompt Engineering: Enhance prompt engineering techniques to better detect and prevent malicious prompts aiming to extract PII. Develop more robust methods for identifying and filtering PII within user queries and system prompts.
- Strengthen Safety Mechanisms: Implement more sophisticated safety mechanisms in LLMs to actively resist and detect attempts at PII extraction, including gradient-based attacks.
- Input Sanitization: Implement strict input sanitization and filtering to remove or modify potentially harmful components of prompts before they reach the LLM's processing stage. This could involve specialized regular expressions or machine learning-based classifiers trained to detect malicious inputs.
- Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of LLMs to identify and address potential vulnerabilities. Consider using adversarial training techniques for enhanced robustness against attack methods.
- Differential Privacy: Explore the use of differential privacy techniques appropriately to limit the disclosure of sensitive PII during training and inference. Weigh the tradeoffs between privacy and utility.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- White-box access to model or deployment internals.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- The vulnerability affects multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs, including (but not limited to) LLaMA2-7b-chat-hf, Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.3, LLaMA3-8b-instruct, Vicuna-7b-v1.5, GPT-4, and Claude 3.5. The attack's…
Research Paper
PIG: Privacy Jailbreak Attack on LLMs via Gradient-based Iterative In-Context Optimization
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
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