The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Dynamic Prompt Jailbreak
GhostPrompt demonstrates a vulnerability in multimodal safety filters used with text-to-image generative models. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass these filters by using a dynamic prompt optimization…
Paper-evaluated models(8)
DALL-E 3, DeepSeek V3, Flux Schnell +5 more
- DALL-E 3
- DeepSeek V3
- Flux Schnell
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4.1
- InternVL 2 2B
- Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
- ShieldLM 7B
Description
GhostPrompt demonstrates a vulnerability in multimodal safety filters used with text-to-image generative models. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass these filters by using a dynamic prompt optimization framework that iteratively generates adversarial prompts designed to evade both text-based and image-based safety checks while preserving the original, harmful intent of the prompt. This bypass is achieved through a combination of semantically aligned prompt rewriting and the injection of benign visual cues to confuse image-level filters.
Examples
See arXiv:2505.18979 (opens in a new tab) for examples of adversarial prompts and the generated images. Specific examples are included in Appendix A of the linked paper and available via controlled access.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to generate and distribute NSFW images, including those depicting violence, gore, hate speech, or other harmful content, despite the presence of safety filters designed to prevent the generation of such material. This undermines the effectiveness of current safety measures and could have severe implications for online safety and the spread of harmful content.
Affected Systems
Text-to-image generative models employing large language model (LLM)-based text safety filters and CLIP-based or similar image safety filters, including but not limited to Stable Diffusion, DALL-E 3, and models employing ShieldLM-7B, GPT-4.1, DeepSeek-V3, and InternVL2-2B.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement dynamic defense strategies that incorporate semantic drift detection to identify anomalies between input prompts and generated images.
- Use multi-stage filtering, cascading LLM-based text filters with vision-language alignment models.
- Incorporate adversarial examples, generated through methods similar to GhostPrompt, into safety filter training data.
- Implement content provenance standards (e.g., C2PA watermarking) to track the origin and authenticity of AI-generated images.
- Develop real-time adversarial attack detection mechanisms.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Vision-language models
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Text-to-image generative models employing large language model (LLM)-based text safety filters and CLIP-based or similar image safety filters, including but not limited to Stable Diffusion, DALL-E 3, and models…
Research Paper
GhostPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models based on Dynamic Optimization
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.18979Related research
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