Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings
LMVD-ID: b7d806a0
Paper published May 1, 2025
Entry analyzed June 11, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

DNA Model Pathogen Synthesis

DNA language models, such as the Evo series, are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that coerce the generation of DNA sequences with high homology to known human pathogens. The GeneBreaker framework demonstrates this by…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(5)

Evo1 7B, Evo2 1B, Evo2 7B +2 more
  • Evo1 7B
  • Evo2 1B
  • Evo2 7B
  • Evo2 40B
  • PathoLM

Description

DNA language models, such as the Evo series, are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that coerce the generation of DNA sequences with high homology to known human pathogens. The GeneBreaker framework demonstrates this by using a combination of carefully crafted prompts leveraging high-homology non-pathogenic sequences and a beam search guided by pathogenicity prediction models (e.g., PathoLM) and log-probability heuristics. This allows bypassing safety mechanisms and generating sequences exceeding 90% similarity to target pathogens.

Examples

The https://github.com/zaixizhang/GeneBreaker (opens in a new tab) repository contains the code and data used to reproduce the attacks. Specific examples of successful jailbreaks targeting SARS-CoV-2 spike protein and HIV-1 envelope protein are detailed in the paper, showing high sequence and structural fidelity between generated and known pathogenic sequences. Attack success rates against Evo models varied across different viral categories, reaching up to 60% for Evo2-40B on certain targets.

Impact

Successful exploitation could lead to the generation of synthetic DNA sequences capable of producing or enhancing dangerous human pathogens, posing significant biosecurity risks. The impact is amplified with larger model sizes.

Affected Systems

DNA language models, specifically those based on transformer architectures and trained on large genomic datasets (e.g., Evo series models). Other generative models with similar architectures and training data may also be susceptible.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust safety mechanisms beyond simple filtering of pathogenic sequences during training.
  • Develop and integrate improved pathogenicity prediction models into the generation process.
  • Incorporate output verification and validation steps involving multiple independent checks (e.g., using different pathogenicity prediction models and sequence similarity algorithms beyond BLAST).
  • Implement more rigorous output monitoring and tracing mechanisms to detect and respond to potentially harmful generations.
  • Restrict access to the models and their outputs.
  • Carefully curate datasets and exclude potentially harmful sequences or patterns to a greater extent than previous methods.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
DNA language models, specifically those based on transformer architectures and trained on large genomic datasets (e.g., Evo series models). Other generative models with similar architectures and training data may also…

Research Paper

GeneBreaker: Jailbreak Attacks against DNA Language Models with Pathogenicity Guidance

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23839