The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Cipher-Character Jailbreak
A vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Large Language Model (LLM) moderation guardrails by using specially crafted prompts containing "cipher characters." These characters, strategically placed within the prompt's…
Paper-evaluated models(2)
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
Description
A vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Large Language Model (LLM) moderation guardrails by using specially crafted prompts containing "cipher characters." These characters, strategically placed within the prompt's output, alter the LLM's response to reduce its "harm" score, enabling the generation of content that would otherwise be blocked. The attack leverages a jailbreak prefix combined with a malicious question and cipher characters to bypass both input and output level filters. This vulnerability is facilitated by the LLM’s reliance on harm scoring and its susceptibility to manipulation of output format.
Examples
See arXiv:2405.20413 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of malicious prompts and cipher-character usage that bypassed moderation systems across four different LLMs.
Impact
Attackers can bypass LLM safety mechanisms and generate harmful content such as hate speech, violent or sexually explicit material, and instructions for self-harm. This compromises the integrity and safety of LLM applications and services.
Affected Systems
The vulnerability impacts several LLMs including (but not limited to) GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, and Llama-3. The vulnerability appears to be generalizable across different LLMs with similar output-based moderation systems.
Mitigation Steps
- Enhanced Output Filtering: Implement more robust output filtering mechanisms capable of identifying and mitigating the impact of cipher characters and other obfuscation techniques. This might involve analyzing the semantic content of the output rather than solely relying on surface-level harm scores.
- Content Complexity Analysis: Develop methods to assess the complexity and unusual formatting of an LLM’s response. Responses exceeding a pre-defined complexity threshold could flag potential manipulation attempts.
- Multi-layered Defence: Employ a combination of input and output filtering techniques, along with a secondary LLM-based audit system to verify the safety of the output before delivery. The audit system should be able to remove redundant or obfuscating elements from the output and then re-assess its harmfulness.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- The vulnerability impacts several LLMs including (but not limited to) GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, and Llama-3. The vulnerability appears to be generalizable across different LLMs with similar output-based moderation systems.
Research Paper
Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.20413Related research
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