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LMVD-ID: d68ac658
Paper published May 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Automated T2I Jailbreak

Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(1)

  • DALL-E 3

Description

Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an automated pipeline to generate prompts that precisely describe copyrighted images, effectively circumventing word-based detection filters.

Examples

See the paper's repository at https://github.com/Kim-Minseon/APGP.git (opens in a new tab) for code and examples of generated prompts. Illustrative examples from the paper show that by carefully crafting prompts, even systems with high initial block rates (e.g., ChatGPT blocking 84% of naive prompts) can be successfully "jailbroken" to generate copyrighted content in a significant percentage of cases (e.g., 76% for ChatGPT with the described attack). Specific example prompts are provided in the paper's Appendix B.3 and Table 4.

Impact

Unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material, leading to copyright infringement and potential legal liabilities for the AI service provider and users. This compromises the integrity and trustworthiness of the AI systems.

Affected Systems

Commercial text-to-image generative AI systems, including but not limited to: ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, and Midjourney (as of May 2024; vulnerability may affect other systems as well).

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust content filtering mechanisms that go beyond simple keyword matching. This may involve analyzing the semantic meaning of prompts and assessing the similarity of generated images to copyrighted material using more sophisticated techniques than simple cosine similarity.
  • Develop techniques to detect and prevent the generation of near-exact replicas of images from the training dataset.
  • Employ diverse, multi-layered security strategies which incorporate both prompt filtering and post-generation image analysis.
  • Regularly update safety filters and models based on ongoing research into adversarial attacks and vulnerabilities.
  • Conduct thorough red-teaming exercises using advanced automated prompt generation techniques to identify and address vulnerabilities systematically.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Ability to influence untrusted model inputs or connected content.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Commercial text-to-image generative AI systems, including but not limited to: ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, and Midjourney (as of May 2024; vulnerability may affect other systems as well).

Research Paper

Automatic Jailbreaking of the Text-to-Image Generative AI Systems

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.16567