Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings
LMVD-ID: dd8af14c
Paper published October 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Automated LLM Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt-based jailbreaks, allowing adversaries to bypass safety guardrails and elicit undesirable outputs. The Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) algorithm…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(9)

Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, Gemini Pro +6 more
  • Claude Instant 1.2
  • Claude 2.1
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo-1106
  • GPT-4-0125-preview
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama Guard
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt-based jailbreaks, allowing adversaries to bypass safety guardrails and elicit undesirable outputs. The Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) algorithm efficiently generates these jailbreaks using a limited number of black-box queries to the target LLM. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to robustly handle adversarial prompts crafted through iterative refinement, even without white-box access to its internal mechanisms.

Examples

See the accompanying paper for specific examples of prompt-level jailbreaks generated by PAIR against GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Vicuna, Gemini Pro, and other evaluated models. Examples include prompts designed to elicit instructions for building bombs, creating phishing emails, and generating hate speech. The paper provides detailed examples of prompt and response pairs that successfully jailbreak the target LLMs.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows adversaries to circumvent the safety mechanisms of LLMs, leading to the generation of harmful, illegal, biased, or otherwise undesirable content. This can be used for purposes including disinformation campaigns, hate speech generation, and the creation of illegal instructions.

Affected Systems

LLMs susceptible to prompt-based jailbreaks, including the evaluated GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Vicuna 13B v1.5, Gemini Pro, Llama 2 7B Chat, Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, and Mixtral 8x7B Instruct models.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved Prompt Filtering: Implement more sophisticated prompt filtering techniques that can identify and block adversarial prompts, including those generated through iterative refinement strategies. This might involve incorporating techniques designed to detect semantic similarities to known adversarial prompts.
  • Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) Improvements: Enhance RLHF training processes to better handle adversarial scenarios and improve the model's resilience against manipulative prompts. This may involve training on a wider range of adversarial prompts.
  • Defense Models: Integrate defense models that identify and neutralize adversarial prompts before they reach the core LLM. This could involve using additional LLMs to evaluate the potential harm of an input prompt before processing.
  • Regular Red Teaming: Conduct regular red teaming exercises using techniques like PAIR to proactively identify and address vulnerabilities in LLM safety mechanisms.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
LLMs susceptible to prompt-based jailbreaks, including the evaluated GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Vicuna 13B v1.5, Gemini Pro, Llama 2 7B Chat, Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, and Mixtral 8x7B Instruct models.

Research Paper

Jailbreaking black box large language models in twenty queries

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.08419