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LMVD-ID: df17adef
Paper published May 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

AutoBreach: Wordplay-Guided Jailbreak

AutoBreach exploits the vulnerability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to wordplay-based adversarial prompts. By leveraging an LLM to generate diverse wordplay mapping rules and employing a two-stage optimization…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(5)

Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +2 more
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Description

AutoBreach exploits the vulnerability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to wordplay-based adversarial prompts. By leveraging an LLM to generate diverse wordplay mapping rules and employing a two-stage optimization strategy, AutoBreach crafts prompts that bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unintended responses, even without modifying system prompts. The vulnerability lies in the LLM's susceptibility to semantic manipulation through cleverly disguised inputs.

Examples

See the paper for examples of successful jailbreaks against various LLMs (Claude-3, GPT-3.5, GPT-4 Turbo, Bing Chat, GPT-4 Web) using AutoBreach's generated adversarial prompts. Specific examples are provided in Figures 3 and 4 of the paper.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass LLM safety filters and elicit responses that violate ethical, legal, or safety guidelines. This can lead to the generation of harmful content, including instructions for illegal activities, biased or discriminatory statements, and the dissemination of misinformation.

Affected Systems

Various LLMs, including but not limited to Claude-3, GPT-3.5, GPT-4 Turbo, and LLMs accessible through web interfaces like Bing Chat and GPT-4 Web. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs with similar underlying architectures and safety mechanisms.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust safety mechanisms that are less susceptible to semantic manipulation through wordplay.
  • Enhance prompt filtering techniques to detect and block adversarial prompts created using wordplay techniques.
  • Develop and deploy more sophisticated detection models capable of identifying malicious intent within prompts, even when disguised through wordplay or other obfuscation techniques.
  • Regularly audit and update safety mechanisms to address emerging jailbreaking techniques. Consider incorporating techniques similar to those used in AutoBreach to proactively test and identify vulnerabilities.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Various LLMs, including but not limited to Claude-3, GPT-3.5, GPT-4 Turbo, and LLMs accessible through web interfaces like Bing Chat and GPT-4 Web. The vulnerability is likely present in other LLMs with similar…

Research Paper

AutoBreach: Universal and Adaptive Jailbreaking with Efficient Wordplay-Guided Optimization

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.19668