Prompt layer Vulnerabilities

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are vulnerable to targeted, low-budget textual perturbations in their natural-language instruction inputs, which can maliciously alter sequential decision-making and downstream physical robotic behavior. Because VLA policies tightly couple language, perception, and control, bounded edits—such as character-level typos, token attribute swaps, or prompt-level uncertainty clauses—propagate through the model's execution trajectory. This allows a black-box…

A vulnerability in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) allows an attacker who controls a single arbitrary agent to map and extract the system's entire confidential communication topology. Unlike prior attacks that rely on direct identity queries and administrative privileges, this attack infers topology stealthily purely from contextual and linguistic signals (stylometry, role-specific syntax), bypassing standard keyword-based and identity-filtering defenses. The exploit relies on a…

A semantic slot filling vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety filters and elicit prohibited content via a single query. The attack, known as StructAttack, decomposes a harmful instruction into a central topic and locally benign-appearing semantic slot types (e.g., "Raw Materials", "Making Process"). These individual slots are embedded into structured visual prompts (such as mind maps, tables, or sunburst diagrams) alongside harmless distractor…

The OpenClaw autonomous agent framework lacks execution sandboxing, running agents directly on the host machine with the disk and system privileges of the host user. This architecture allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) and arbitrary data exfiltration via Indirect Prompt Injection. By embedding malicious instructions within external data sources (e.g., scraped web pages or uploaded documents), an attacker can hijack the agent's planning capabilities to sequentially chain…

GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B and Meta-SecAlign (70B/8B) are vulnerable to white-box adversarial attacks generated by automated algorithmic recombination (specifically the claude_v63, claude_v82, and claude_v53-oss optimizers). These algorithms significantly outperform standard discrete optimization methods (like GCG) by integrating continuous optimization (ADC) with LayerNorm gradient scaling (LSGM), or by merging momentum-smoothed gradients with directional perturbation candidate selection (DPTO)…

Inference-time Personally Identifiable Information (PII) leakage is significantly amplified when using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-enabled Large Language Models (LLMs). When an attacker or user elicits step-by-step reasoning or utilizes models with native "thinking" token budgets, sensitive context data provided in the prompt is directly resurfaced into intermediate reasoning steps or the final output. This bypasses output-level privacy policies instructing the model not to…

An "in-content harm" vulnerability exists in safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) where task-level alignment mechanisms fail to evaluate the safety of user-provided external data. Attackers can bypass safety guardrails by embedding policy-violating text (e.g., violence, self-harm, explicit content) within the payload of a seemingly benign, policy-compliant task (e.g., translation, summarization, grammar polishing). Because the primary instruction is harmless, the LLM's safety filters…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak technique termed "Priority Hacking." Adversaries can bypass safety alignments by exploiting the model's internal priority graph, where certain abstract values (e.g., justice, public health) implicitly outweigh general safety restrictions within specific contexts. By crafting a deceptive prompt that frames a malicious request as a necessary action in service of a higher-priority benign value, attackers engineer a value conflict. The…

A prompt structure vulnerability exists in instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) where attackers can bypass safety alignments by injecting a continuation-triggering suffix immediately following the user prompt termination token. By placing an affirmative suffix outside the user instruction boundary, it is processed as the beginning of the assistant's own pre-filled response. This structural manipulation intrinsically overactivates the model's continuation attention heads, forcing its…

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) used for real-world agent planning are vulnerable to Action-level Manipulation (dubbed "Blindfold"), a jailbreak technique that bypasses semantic-level safety filters by exploiting the models' limited spatial and causal reasoning regarding physical consequences. Attackers can use an adversarial proxy LLM to decompose a semantically harmful intent into a sequence of individually benign primitive actions. To evade advanced semantic correlation checks…