Injection Vulnerabilities

Multimodal agents built on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to adaptive typographic prompt injection attacks (AgentTypo). This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute indirect prompt injection by embedding adversarial text prompts directly into images (e.g., webpage screenshots, product photos) processed by the agent. Unlike standard visual adversarial attacks that rely on noise perturbation, this method utilizes the AgentTypo framework to perform black-box Bayesian…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents powered by LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct and Gemini-2.0-flash are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial exploitation that bypasses safety alignment through toxic memory injection, planning scaffolds (Chain-of-Thought/ReAct), and jailbreak fine-tuning. Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, this vulnerability exploits the agentic nature of the system—specifically memory retention and reasoning capabilities—to sustain and escalate harassment over prolonged interactions. When…

Deep Research (DR) agents, specifically those utilizing the "think-search-draft" architecture such as the WebThinker framework, contain a logic vulnerability in their recursive planning and information retrieval workflows. While the underlying Large Language Model (LLM) may possess alignment safeguards to reject harmful queries, the agentic framework creates a bypass vector. When a user submits a harmful query using specific adversarial strategies—specifically "Plan Injection" (manipulating…

A vulnerability exists in the self-reflection and introspection capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-LLMs that allows attackers to perform black-box adversarial optimization using only textual model responses. This technique, termed "Asking for Directions" (AfD), bypasses the need for access to gradients, logits, or continuous confidence scores. The attacker employs a hill-climbing optimization strategy where they present the target model with two candidate inputs (an…

AI code agents are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that cause them to generate or complete malicious code. The vulnerability is significantly amplified when a base Large Language Model (LLM) is integrated into an agentic framework that uses multi-step planning and tool-use. Initial safety refusals by the LLM are frequently overturned during subsequent planning or self-correction steps within the agent's reasoning loop.

A jailbreak vulnerability, known as Task Concurrency, exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs). The vulnerability arises when two distinct tasks, one harmful and one benign, are interleaved at the word level within a single prompt. The structure of the malicious prompt alternates words from each task, often using separators like {} to encapsulate words from the second task. This "concurrent" instruction format obfuscates the harmful intent from the model's safety guardrails, causing the…

A vulnerability termed "Controlled-Release Prompting" allows attackers to bypass lightweight input filters (prompt guards) deployed in front of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack exploits the computational resource asymmetry between the resource-constrained guard model and the highly capable target model. Attackers encode malicious instructions using obfuscation techniques—such as substitution ciphers (Timed-Release) or verbose character descriptions (Spaced-Release)—that require…

A distributed backdoor vulnerability, named "Collaborative Shadows", exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) that rely on external or modifiable tools. An attacker can poison multiple agent tools by embedding inert, encrypted "attack primitives" within them. These primitives are fragments of a larger malicious payload. A carefully crafted user instruction acts as both a trigger and a decryption key. The instruction steers the agents to collaborate in a specific sequence, causing them to…

A "Priming Vulnerability" exists in Masked Diffusion Language Models (MDLMs) due to their iterative, parallel denoising inference mechanism. Unlike autoregressive models that generate tokens sequentially, MDLMs refine a sequence from a fully masked state through multiple denoising steps. The vulnerability arises because standard safety alignment (e.g., SFT, DPO, MOSA) typically optimizes the model to generate safe responses only when initialized from a fully masked sequence. If an affirmative…

LLM-based coding agents integrated into IDEs (e.g., VS Code Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf) are vulnerable to a query-agnostic Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attack termed "QueryIPI." This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the developer's machine by injecting a malicious tool definition (e.g., via the Model Context Protocol) into the agent's context.