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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

337 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Visual prompt injection crosses document trust boundaries

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Untrusted document images can redirect vision-language agents across instruction and tool-authorization boundaries. Repeat-After-Me evaluates six victim models on constructed document tasks.

Repeat-After-Me: Black-Box Adaptive Visual Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: claude-opus-4-7, GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro+3 more
  • claude-opus-4-7
  • GPT-5.5
  • Gemini 3.1 Pro
  • Qwen3.6-27B
  • Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 38B Instruct

Context privilege escalation in AI agent harnesses

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Context assembly can promote repository, tool or skill content into higher-priority instructions or persistent state. The paper studies 12 pinned agent-harness versions.

What's in Your Agent's Context? Context Privilege Escalation Attacks against AI Agent Harness
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, GPT-5.4-mini, Claude Sonnet 4.6+4 more
  • GPT-5.5
  • GPT-5.4-mini
  • Claude Sonnet 4.6
  • Claude Opus 4.6
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • DeepSeek V4 Flash

Single-interaction poisoning of agent memory

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A stored interaction can later steer a memory-augmented agent's answer without direct memory-store access. The study evaluates persistent response manipulation in MemoryOS and MemGPT.

InjecMEM: Memory Injection Attack on LLM Agent Memory Systems
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct+3 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skills

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Self-evolving agent-skill systems may promote recurring, attacker-controlled execution records into persistent reusable instructions. The paper evaluates whether poisoned but task-plausible trajectories survive aggregation and appear in generated skill artifacts, using inert canary behaviors and two structurally different skill-evolution pipelines.

When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-5.4, MiniMax M2.5, DeepSeek V3.2+3 more
  • GPT-5.4
  • MiniMax M2.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • DeepSeek V4-Pro
  • Qwen3.5-35B-A3B
  • Qwen3.5-122B-A10B

Dynamic Security Testing for Third-Party Agent Skills

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable, skill-attributed side effects rather than treating suspicious text, ordinary privileged operations, or unexecuted paths as proven malicious behavior.

SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skills
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V4-Pro

Persistent Agent Memory Poisoning and Incomplete Repair

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates 310 human-reviewed cases across two harnesses, four memory backends, three model backends, and seven evidence-gated lifecycle checkpoints.

MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, DeepSeek V4-Pro, MiniMax-M3

Workspace Agent Runtime Safety Failures Across Risk Carriers

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AgentS4D measures unsafe actions and state changes across complete workspace-agent executions rather than treating task completion or isolated model responses as safety evidence. Its 328 sandboxed cases introduce risky content through user requests, documents, web resources, tools, third-party skills, and persistent memory, then compare the same cases across four agent harnesses and five model backends.

AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, DeepSeek V4-Pro+2 more
  • GPT-5.5
  • Gemini 3.1 Pro
  • DeepSeek V4-Pro
  • MiniMax-M3
  • Qwen3.7-Plus

Incomplete MCP Tool-Call Attack Detection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The MTGuard study evaluates unsafe Model Context Protocol tool calls originating from compromised server data, host-side execution changes, and malicious user-controlled resources. Its hybrid monitor combines pre-execution parameter inspection, behavioral observation, and post-execution result verification across browser-automation and financial-analysis agents.

Hybrid Analysis for Secure MCP Tool Use in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.6 Luna, DeepSeek V4 Flash, DeepSeek V4-Pro

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.