Attack Type
Attacks that inject malicious content into model inputs
337 matching entries
Untrusted document images can redirect vision-language agents across instruction and tool-authorization boundaries. Repeat-After-Me evaluates six victim models on constructed document tasks.
Source: arXiv
Context assembly can promote repository, tool or skill content into higher-priority instructions or persistent state. The paper studies 12 pinned agent-harness versions.
Source: arXiv
A stored interaction can later steer a memory-augmented agent's answer without direct memory-store access. The study evaluates persistent response manipulation in MemoryOS and MemGPT.
Source: arXiv
Third-party skills can inflate coding-agent resource use while an otherwise legitimate task remains functional.
Source: arXiv
Lower-trust tool content can assert facts beyond its authority and distort an agent's decisions. PIPES screens response units against source provenance and expected field meaning.
Source: arXiv
Self-evolving agent-skill systems may promote recurring, attacker-controlled execution records into persistent reusable instructions. The paper evaluates whether poisoned but task-plausible trajectories survive aggregation and appear in generated skill artifacts, using inert canary behaviors and two structurally different skill-evolution pipelines.
Source: arXiv
SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable, skill-attributed side effects rather than treating suspicious text, ordinary privileged operations, or unexecuted paths as proven malicious behavior.
Source: arXiv
MemSecBench follows malicious agent-memory content from initial write through persistence, retrieval, action selection, execution, and attempted selective repair. Its controlled Write–Execute–Forget protocol evaluates 310 human-reviewed cases across two harnesses, four memory backends, three model backends, and seven evidence-gated lifecycle checkpoints.
Source: arXiv
AgentS4D measures unsafe actions and state changes across complete workspace-agent executions rather than treating task completion or isolated model responses as safety evidence. Its 328 sandboxed cases introduce risky content through user requests, documents, web resources, tools, third-party skills, and persistent memory, then compare the same cases across four agent harnesses and five model backends.
Source: arXiv
The MTGuard study evaluates unsafe Model Context Protocol tool calls originating from compromised server data, host-side execution changes, and malicious user-controlled resources. Its hybrid monitor combines pre-execution parameter inspection, behavioral observation, and post-execution result verification across browser-automation and financial-analysis agents.
Source: arXiv