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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

18 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

TEE Advisor Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based security advisors exhibit systematic reasoning failures—including boundary confusion, attestation overclaiming, and mitigation hallucination—when providing architectural guidance for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX and Arm TrustZone. When embedded in tool-augmented agent pipelines, these models are susceptible to agentic misinterpretation, turning partial or poisoned tool outputs into highly confident but materially incorrect security conclusions. This…

Red-Teaming Claude Opus and ChatGPT-based Security Advisors for Trusted Execution Environments
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.6

Mobile Agent Visual Spoofing

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating under the "Screen-as-Interface" paradigm are vulnerable to visual indirect prompt injection and state desynchronization. Agents that rely on unstructured visual data (screenshots) and Accessibility Service APIs to perceive the environment lack a mechanism to distinguish between trusted system UI elements and untrusted content (e.g., web pages, emails, or malicious overlays). An attacker can inject visual cues, fake notifications, or hidden…

Blind Gods and Broken Screens: Architecting a Secure, Intent-Centric Mobile Agent Operating System
Evaluated models: Not reported

Adversarial Claim Search Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Search-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) fact-checking systems are vulnerable to adversarial claim attacks that exploit the pipeline's reliance on claim interpretation, query formulation, and dynamic evidence retrieval. By manipulating the linguistic structure of an input claim while preserving its semantic factual intent, an attacker can induce systematic verification failures. This vulnerability stems from three specific attack surfaces: 1. Search Engine Misguidance: Altering lexical…

DECEIVE-AFC: Adversarial Claim Attacks against Search-Enabled LLM-based Fact-Checking Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Confident Misinformation Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Instruct

LLM Judge Framing Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+11 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Metacognitive Prompting Lowers Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

MLLM Chart Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Code-generation Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to directed misuse for the generation of misleading data visualizations. This vulnerability, described as the "ChartAttack" framework, allows an attacker to prompt the model to manipulate chart annotation code (e.g., JSON specifications for Matplotlib or Vega-Lite) to apply specific "misleaders"—design choices that distort data interpretation without altering the underlying data values. By…

ChartAttack: Testing the Vulnerability of LLMs to Malicious Prompting in Chart Generation
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 14B, LLaVA 7B, Phi-3

Helpful Agent Default Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the task-planning and execution logic of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically within trip-planning and web-use agents. The vulnerability, identified as a "User-Mediated Attack," occurs because agents prioritize task completion and "helpfulness" over safety verification when processing content provided by the user. When a benign user forwards untrusted external content (e.g., promotional text containing phishing links or malicious instructions) to the agent…

Too Helpful to Be Safe: User-Mediated Attacks on Planning and Web-Use Agents
Evaluated models: Not reported

Distractor Inverse Scaling

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning-capable Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic AI systems exhibit a critical vulnerability to contextual distractors, resulting in catastrophic performance degradation (up to 80% drop in accuracy) and emergent misalignment. When the input context contains noise—specifically random documents, irrelevant chat history, or task-specific "hard negative" distractors—the models fail to filter this information. Instead of ignoring the noise, the models disproportionately attend to…

Lost in the Noise: How Reasoning Models Fail with Contextual Distractors
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek R1 0528+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Qwen 3 4B Thinking 2507
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking 2507

Strategic Abstention Failure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A "risk-invariance" vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) wherein the model's decision-making policy is functionally decoupled from its verbalized confidence and externally defined error penalties. Despite generating calibrated confidence estimates (internal epistemic uncertainty), affected models fail to adjust their abstention thresholds when presented with high-penalty incentives (e.g., negative utility for incorrect answers). This results in "utility collapse," where models…

Are LLM Decisions Faithful to Verbal Confidence?
Evaluated models: GPT-5 Mini, GPT-5 Nano, GPT-4.1 Mini+7 more
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Gemini 3 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3n E4B
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Thinking
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Thinking

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.