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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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16 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Lifecycle poisoning of reusable agent skills

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper presents SkillSec-Eval, a controlled evaluation of attacks against reusable agent skills across repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, runtime execution, and updates. It reports that malicious metadata, retrieval manipulation, unsafe workflow composition, and poisoned updates can cause agents to retrieve, select, or execute unintended skills. These are paper-reported benchmark results, not independently verified vulnerabilities in a named production product.

Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
Evaluated models: all-MiniLM-L6-v2, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash

Zombie Agent Persistence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Unified Robustness Gap

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+2 more
  • E5 BERT-base
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Skywork Reward V2

Direct Emoji Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Mistral 7B, Gemma 2 9B, and Llama 3 8B, are vulnerable to safety filter bypass via "Emoji-Based Jailbreaking." This adversarial prompt engineering technique exploits the model's tokenization and internal representation of Unicode emoji characters. By utilizing "emoji stuffing" (inserting emojis between textual tokens) or "emoji chaining" (using sequences of emojis as semantic proxies for sensitive terms), attackers can evade keyword-based safety…

Emoji-Based Jailbreaking of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2 7B+1 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Pretrained Leak Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) finetuned from open-weight pretrained sources inherit adversarial vulnerabilities encoded in the pretrained model's internal representations. An attacker with white-box access to a pretrained model (e.g., Llama-2, Llama-3) can identify linearly separable features in the hidden states that correlate with "transferable" jailbreak prompts. By exploiting these features using a Probe-Guided Projection (PGP) attack, the attacker can optimize adversarial suffixes on the…

One Leak Away: How Pretrained Model Exposure Amplifies Jailbreak Risks in Finetuned LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat+5 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Qwen 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Semantic Intention Obfuscation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The KG-DF (Knowledge Graph Defense Framework) contains a logic vulnerability in its Semantic Parsing Module, specifically within the keyword extraction phase defined as $K_{core} = \text{LLM}(P_{prompt})$. The framework relies on a Large Language Model (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo) to distill user input into keywords ($K_{core}$), which are then embedded to retrieve security warning triples ($T_{match}$) from a Knowledge Graph.

KG-DF: A Black-box Defense Framework against Jailbreak Attacks Based on Knowledge Graphs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Special Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1+9 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Phi-4
  • Prompt Guard
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • ShieldGemma 2 27B

Single Query Dynamic Output

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-label text classification systems that allows for Textual Dynamic Outputs Attacks (TDOA). This technique enables hard-label black-box attacks against systems with variable or generative output spaces (where the number of labels or specific label tokens are not fixed). The attack functions by training a surrogate model on clustered coarse-grained labels derived from the victim model's fine-grained dynamic outputs. It subsequently…

Text Adversarial Attacks with Dynamic Outputs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • BERT
  • DistilBERT
  • RoBERTa

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.