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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

34 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Judge Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct

TEE Advisor Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based security advisors exhibit systematic reasoning failures—including boundary confusion, attestation overclaiming, and mitigation hallucination—when providing architectural guidance for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX and Arm TrustZone. When embedded in tool-augmented agent pipelines, these models are susceptible to agentic misinterpretation, turning partial or poisoned tool outputs into highly confident but materially incorrect security conclusions. This…

Red-Teaming Claude Opus and ChatGPT-based Security Advisors for Trusted Execution Environments
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.6

Discrete Token Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Discrete image tokenizers are vulnerable to unsupervised embedding-space adversarial attacks. Attackers can apply $\ell_p$-bounded perturbations to an input image to maximize the $\ell_2$ distance of the pre-quantization continuous embeddings produced by the tokenizer's vision encoder. This forces the vector quantizer to cross discrete cell boundaries and assign incorrect codebook vectors, fundamentally altering the resulting token sequence. Because the attack targets the pre-quantization…

On the Adversarial Robustness of Discrete Image Tokenizers
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Chunky Post-Training Miscalibration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability termed "chunky post-training," where the model learns spurious correlations between incidental prompt features (e.g., formatting styles, specific vocabulary, sentence structure) and specific behavioral modes (e.g., refusal, code generation, rebuttal) present in distinct chunks of post-training data. This results in behavioral mis-routing during inference, where benign inputs sharing surface-level features with restricted or specialized…

Chunky Post-Training: Data Driven Failures of Generalization
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5+5 more
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • GPT-5.1
  • Grok 4.1 Mini
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Tülu 3 405B

Invisible Prompt Phishing Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal LLM-based phishing detection systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via "perceptual asymmetry." Attackers can embed hidden instructions within a phishing site's HTML, CSS, URLs, or rendered images that remain imperceptible to human victims but are parsed and executed by the evaluating LLM. This vulnerability allows threat actors to manipulate the LLM's contextual understanding, forcing it to misclassify malicious sites as benign (Legitimate Pretexting), trigger safety…

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning, Llama 4 Maverick+1 more
  • GPT-5
  • Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 27B

Covert Grade Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for Automatic Short Answer Grading (ASAG) are vulnerable to the "GradingAttack" framework, which employs fine-grained adversarial manipulation to alter grading outcomes. Attackers can leverage two distinct strategies: (1) Prompt-level attacks using role-play injection strings that instruct the model to pretend an answer is correct regardless of factual accuracy, and (2) Token-level attacks utilizing gradient-based optimization (similar to Greedy Coordinate…

GradingAttack: Attacking Large Language Models Towards Short Answer Grading Ability
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Unified Robustness Gap

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+2 more
  • E5 BERT-base
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Skywork Reward V2

Universal MLLM Target Matching

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Closed-source Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Universal Targeted Transferable Adversarial Attacks (UTTAA). An attacker can generate a single, image-agnostic adversarial perturbation ($\delta$) that, when added to any arbitrary source image, steers the victim model to output a description or classification matching a specific target image chosen by the attacker. This vulnerability exploits the transferability of adversarial features from open-source surrogate vision…

Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.