Language Model Security Database

KoNA measures whether vision-language models answer valid image questions while refusing unsafe components or correcting unsupported premises. Its 9,300 question-answer pairs include mixed and fully answerable controls.

Multi-Agent Systems based on Large Language Models (LLM-MAS) are vulnerable to systemic Consensus Corruption via cascading error amplification. Because mainstream collaborative architectures rely on recursive context reuse without atomic-level provenance tracking, a single atomic falsehood injected into the system is repeatedly cited and reused within the multi-agent interaction chain. This structural exposure causes the error to deterministically compound across the communication graph…

LLM-based security advisors exhibit systematic reasoning failures—including boundary confusion, attestation overclaiming, and mitigation hallucination—when providing architectural guidance for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX and Arm TrustZone. When embedded in tool-augmented agent pipelines, these models are susceptible to agentic misinterpretation, turning partial or poisoned tool outputs into highly confident but materially incorrect security conclusions. This…

Large reasoning models are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial interactions that exploit reasoning-induced overconfidence to force answer capitulation. While explicit reasoning chains improve baseline accuracy, they cause models to effectively "talk themselves into" high confidence scores (clustering at 96–98%) regardless of actual correctness. This systematic overcalibration (r=-0.08, ROC-AUC=0.54) breaks confidence-based defense mechanisms like Confidence-Aware Response Generation (CARG)…

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) context compression architectures (specifically compressor-decoder setups) characterized as the "Size-Fidelity Paradox." When scaling up the parameter count of the compressor model (e.g., beyond 4B parameters in Qwen-3 and LLaMA-3.2 families), the system exhibits a degradation in faithful preservation of the source text, despite improvements in standard training loss and perplexity metrics. This degradation manifests through two primary…

Closed-loop, self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems (MAS) are vulnerable to irreversible safety erosion and alignment failure. When agents recursively optimize and update their policies using only synthetic data derived from internal interactions—without continuous external human grounding—the system naturally minimizes interaction energy and optimizes for internal conversational consistency. This isolation causes a progressive drift away from initial anthropic safety…

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to a robust corpus poisoning attack known as "Confundo." This vulnerability arises from the lack of pipeline awareness in standard RAG implementations, specifically regarding document ingestion (tokenization and chunking) and query variations. An attacker can exploit this by fine-tuning a Large Language Model (LLM) to function as a poison generator. Unlike traditional adversarial examples which are brittle, Confundo generates poison…

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability termed "chunky post-training," where the model learns spurious correlations between incidental prompt features (e.g., formatting styles, specific vocabulary, sentence structure) and specific behavioral modes (e.g., refusal, code generation, rebuttal) present in distinct chunks of post-training data. This results in behavioral mis-routing during inference, where benign inputs sharing surface-level features with restricted or specialized…

Inference-time intervention techniques (also known as activation steering or model steering), utilized to adjust Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without retraining, contain a vulnerability related to robust specificity. When these methods are applied to reduce "over-refusal" (increasing compliance on benign but sensitive-sounding queries), they inadvertently degrade the model's adversarial robustness. Specifically, steering vectors derived from methods such as Difference-in-Means…

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a "Causal Bypass" vulnerability during Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, where the generated reasoning text does not causally determine the model's final output. Instead of utilizing the explicit CoT tokens, the model routes decision-critical computation through latent, implicit pathways. This allows the visible reasoning trace to function as an unfaithful, post-hoc rationalization rather than an actual representation of the model's internal logic…