Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

24 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Repository-Level Coding Agent Vulnerability Detection Gaps

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

VulnGym measures whether coding agents can locate and explain repository-level security vulnerabilities from realistic advisory and source-code context. The benchmark contains 184 reviewed advisories, 408 line-annotated vulnerability entries, and 23 repositories, with separate end-to-end detection and oracle-conditioned localization tasks.

VulnGym: Benchmarking Coding Agents for Repository-Level Vulnerability Detection
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V4 Flash, GLM 5.2, MiniMax-M3+4 more
  • DeepSeek V4 Flash
  • GLM 5.2
  • MiniMax-M3
  • Qwen3.5-2B
  • Qwen3.5-4B
  • Qwen3.5-9B
  • Qwen3.5-27B

Prompt injection across agent privilege boundaries

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Untrusted issue descriptions and tool responses can redirect privileged coding and tool agents. Twin Agent separates exploration from execution and restricts the information exchanged between them.

Twin Agent: Context Residual Compression for Privilege Separated Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash

Single-Document Reasoning Poisoning in RAG

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a specific black-box knowledge-base poisoning attack against retrieval-augmented reasoning systems. An attacker who can add one query-specific document to the corpus can cause it to be retrieved and influence the LLM toward an attacker-chosen answer. AdversarialCoT shapes the document around the target model’s observable reasoning structure and iteratively refines retrieval relevance and persuasive reasoning using final model feedback. The paper reports this as an…

AdversarialCoT: Single-Document Retrieval Poisoning for LLM Reasoning
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, GLM 4.5, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct+1 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GLM 4.5
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B

LLM Judge Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct

Autonomous Agent Tool RCE

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The OpenClaw autonomous agent framework lacks execution sandboxing, running agents directly on the host machine with the disk and system privileges of the host user. This architecture allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) and arbitrary data exfiltration via Indirect Prompt Injection. By embedding malicious instructions within external data sources (e.g., scraped web pages or uploaded documents), an attacker can hijack the agent's planning capabilities to sequentially chain…

Uncovering Security Threats and Architecting Defenses in Autonomous Agents: A Case Study of OpenClaw
Evaluated models: Not reported

Agent Lifecycle Compound Threats

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Taming openclaw: Security analysis and mitigation of autonomous llm agent threats
Evaluated models: Not reported

Cascading Agent False Consensus

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-Agent Systems based on Large Language Models (LLM-MAS) are vulnerable to systemic Consensus Corruption via cascading error amplification. Because mainstream collaborative architectures rely on recursive context reuse without atomic-level provenance tracking, a single atomic falsehood injected into the system is repeatedly cited and reused within the multi-agent interaction chain. This structural exposure causes the error to deterministically compound across the communication graph…

From Spark to Fire: Modeling and Mitigating Error Cascades in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Stealthy Tool-Call Token Exhaust

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenClaw v2026.2.9 is vulnerable to a resource amplification and economic denial-of-service (DoS) attack via malicious third-party skills. An attacker can publish a Trojanized skill that exploits the framework's tool-calling loop and context-management architecture by injecting a multi-turn "Segmented Verification Protocol" (SVP). Malicious instructions embedded in the skill's SKILL.md file mandate extensive autoregressive sequence generation, while a companion script returns PROGRESS, REPAIR…

Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stealthy Token Exhaustion in OpenClaw Agents
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro

Rubric Stealthy Preference Drift

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-as-a-Judge systems utilizing natural language rubrics are vulnerable to Rubric-Induced Preference Drift (RIPD). This vulnerability allows an attacker (or a flawed optimization process) to refine evaluation rubrics such that they maintain high agreement with human references on standard validation benchmarks while inducing systematic, directional preference degradation on unseen target domains. The attack exploits the disconnect between benchmark validation and target generalization by…

Rubrics as an Attack Surface: Stealthy Preference Drift in LLM Judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek V3+1 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 2B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.