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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

7 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

RL Adversarial Function Call

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B+1 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B

Plaintext Output Overflow

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) contain a resource consumption vulnerability termed "Overflow," wherein specific non-adversarial, plain-text prompts trigger excessive text generation that saturates the model's output token budget. This vulnerability exploits the model's alignment towards helpfulness and exhaustiveness, alongside tokenizer inefficiencies (e.g., zero-width characters), to force the generation of maximum-length responses (often exceeding 5,000 tokens) from short inputs. This differs…

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+5 more
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemma 3 4B IT

LLM Infinite Thinking DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Lumimaid 70B
  • o4-mini
  • MAI DS R1 671B
  • DeepSeek R1 0528 Qwen3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • DeepSeek R1 671B

Single Query Dynamic Output

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-label text classification systems that allows for Textual Dynamic Outputs Attacks (TDOA). This technique enables hard-label black-box attacks against systems with variable or generative output spaces (where the number of labels or specific label tokens are not fixed). The attack functions by training a surrogate model on clustered coarse-grained labels derived from the victim model's fine-grained dynamic outputs. It subsequently…

Text Adversarial Attacks with Dynamic Outputs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • BERT
  • DistilBERT
  • RoBERTa

LLM Judge Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Flowchart-based LVLM Jailbreak Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

FC-Attack leverages automatically generated flowcharts containing step-by-step descriptions derived or rephrased from harmful queries, combined with a benign textual prompt, to jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). The vulnerability lies in the model's susceptibility to visual prompts containing harmful information within the flowcharts, thus bypassing safety alignment mechanisms.

FC-Attack: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Auto-Generated Flowcharts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620, Gemini 1.5 Flash, GPT-4o 2024-08-06+4 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o 2024-08-06
  • GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18
  • InternVL2.5 8B
  • LLaVA NeXT 8B
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct

LLM Adversarial Forecast Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM)-based time series forecasting architectures, specifically affecting models such as TimeGPT, LLMTime, and TimeLLM. These models are susceptible to a gradient-free, black-box adversarial attack method termed Directional Gradient Approximation (DGA). An attacker can inject imperceptible perturbations into the historical time series input window (lookback window) to manipulate the model's output. By treating the model as a black box and…

Adversarial vulnerabilities in large language models for time series forecasting
Evaluated models: TimeGPT, GPT-3.5, GPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.