Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

Explore primary-source AI security research, evaluated models, attack techniques, and defensive evidence.

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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Agent Lifecycle Compound Threats

Published Mar 12, 2026Analyzed Apr 10, 2026Source: arXiv

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Taming openclaw: Security analysis and mitigation of autonomous llm agent threats

Evaluated models: Not reported

GPT Tool Misuse

Published Nov 28, 2025Analyzed Dec 8, 2025Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in OpenAI's Custom GPTs platform where the lack of effective isolation between the system context ("Expert Prompt"), external knowledge retrieval, and user input allows for unauthorized information disclosure and tool misuse. By employing specific prompt injection techniques—including Hex injection, Many-shot prefix attacks, and Knowledge Poisoning (uploading malicious files)—an attacker can bypass safety guardrails. This results in the extraction of proprietary system…

An Empirical Study on the Security Vulnerabilities of GPTs

Evaluated models: DALL-E

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.