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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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5 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

No-Prompt Reasoning Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

An implicit reasoning hijacking vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and LLM-based agent frameworks. Attackers with write access to an agent's external memory or knowledge base can inject adversarially optimized malicious instances that trigger jailbreaks without requiring any modifications to the user's input prompt. The attack utilizes a shadow model to extract high-contribution subword tokens from anticipated benign user queries via log-probability changes and…

Stop Fixating on Prompts: Reasoning Hijacking and Constraint Tightening for Red-Teaming LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, GPT-5+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 3.0 Pro
  • ERNIE 3.5

RAG Knowledgebase Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to iterative knowledge-extraction attacks designed to reconstruct the underlying private knowledge base. The vulnerability exists due to the decoupled optimization of the retrieval and generation phases. Attackers can craft adversarial queries consisting of two distinct components: an "Information" component (optimized via gradient descent or random sampling to steer embeddings toward specific, diverse regions of the vector space) and…

Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Special Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1+9 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Phi-4
  • Prompt Guard
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • ShieldGemma 2 27B

MLM Adaptive RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that allows for black-box adversarial attacks known as "CtrlRAG." This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting maliciously crafted inputs into the system's knowledge base. Unlike traditional injection attacks that rely on direct concatenation, CtrlRAG utilizes a Masked Language Model (MLM) to iteratively replace words in the malicious text. This optimization ensures…

CtrlRAG: Black-box Document Poisoning Attacks for Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+2 more
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1

Agent Action Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3, GPT-4+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • M3E
  • MiniLM

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.