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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

94 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 4/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to pixel-level adversarial image perturbations. An attacker can inject $\ell_p$-bounded, human-imperceptible noise into an input image to manipulate the model's multi-modal embedding space. This reliably causes the VLM to generate incorrect textual responses, hallucinate non-existent objects, or misclassify subjects, effectively decoupling the model's reasoning from the actual visual evidence. The vulnerability is exploitable via both white-box…

PDA: Text-Augmented Defense Framework for Robust Vision-Language Models against Adversarial Image Attacks
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.5 13B, DeepSeek VL 1.3B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B and Meta-SecAlign (70B/8B) are vulnerable to white-box adversarial attacks generated by automated algorithmic recombination (specifically the claude_v63, claude_v82, and claude_v53-oss optimizers). These algorithms significantly outperform standard discrete optimization methods (like GCG) by integrating continuous optimization (ADC) with LayerNorm gradient scaling (LSGM), or by merging momentum-smoothed gradients with directional perturbation candidate selection (DPTO)…

Claudini: Autoresearch Discovers State-of-the-Art Adversarial Attack Algorithms for LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a highly transferable, black-box adversarial image attack known as the Multi-Paradigm Collaborative Attack (MPCAttack). Attackers can craft imperceptible visual perturbations by jointly aggregating and optimizing semantic feature representations extracted from surrogate models across three distinct learning paradigms: cross-modal alignment (e.g., CLIP), multi-modal understanding (e.g., InternVL3), and visual self-supervised learning…

Multi-Paradigm Collaborative Adversarial Attack Against Multi-Modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, InternVL3 8B, LLaVA 1.5 7B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

LLaVA-v1.5-7B, when deployed as a vision-language autonomous agent, is highly vulnerable to adversarial image perturbations. An attacker can inject imperceptibly modified images into a web environment (such as an e-commerce storefront). When the VLM agent captures a screenshot containing the perturbed image, the visual noise forces the model to misclassify the scene and output incorrect, structured JSON actions. This allows an attacker to hijack the agent's task execution, bypassing the user's…

Adversarial attacks against Modern Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, LLaVA 1.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

A vulnerability in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) relying on shared visual-textual representation spaces allows attackers to induce transferable cross-task semantic failures using an X-shaped Sparse Pixel Attack (XSPA). Attackers craft imperceptible adversarial perturbations restricted to a fixed geometric prior—two intersecting diagonal lines comprising approximately 1.76% of the image pixels. By jointly optimizing a classification objective with cross-task semantic guidance (target-semantic…

XSPA: Crafting Imperceptible X-Shaped Sparse Adversarial Perturbations for Transferable Attacks on VLMs
Evaluated models: InstructBLIP

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for Automatic Short Answer Grading (ASAG) are vulnerable to the "GradingAttack" framework, which employs fine-grained adversarial manipulation to alter grading outcomes. Attackers can leverage two distinct strategies: (1) Prompt-level attacks using role-play injection strings that instruct the model to pretend an answer is correct regardless of factual accuracy, and (2) Token-level attacks utilizing gradient-based optimization (similar to Greedy Coordinate…

GradingAttack: Attacking Large Language Models Towards Short Answer Grading Ability
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Discrete image tokenizers are vulnerable to unsupervised embedding-space adversarial attacks. Attackers can apply $\ell_p$-bounded perturbations to an input image to maximize the $\ell_2$ distance of the pre-quantization continuous embeddings produced by the tokenizer's vision encoder. This forces the vector quantizer to cross discrete cell boundaries and assign incorrect codebook vectors, fundamentally altering the resulting token sequence. Because the attack targets the pre-quantization…

On the Adversarial Robustness of Discrete Image Tokenizers
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

A vulnerability in offline multi-armed bandit (MAB) evaluation frameworks allows attackers to completely hijack arm selection by applying imperceptibly small adversarial perturbations to the weights of the underlying reward model before training begins. Because the required perturbation norm decreases as the input dimensionality increases ($\mathcal{O}(d^{-1/2})$), high-dimensional reward models—such as wide neural networks or linear models used for generative model assessment—are highly…

Efficient Adversarial Attacks on High-dimensional Offline Bandits
Evaluated models: Stable Diffusion

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.