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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

5 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Incomplete MCP Tool-Call Attack Detection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The MTGuard study evaluates unsafe Model Context Protocol tool calls originating from compromised server data, host-side execution changes, and malicious user-controlled resources. Its hybrid monitor combines pre-execution parameter inspection, behavioral observation, and post-execution result verification across browser-automation and financial-analysis agents.

Hybrid Analysis for Secure MCP Tool Use in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-5.6 Luna, DeepSeek V4 Flash, DeepSeek V4-Pro

Stage-Sequential Agent Escalation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Agentic Large Language Model (LLM) systems utilizing persistent memory, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines, and external tool connectors are vulnerable to Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI). An attacker can inject obfuscated (e.g., encoded, structurally nested, or semantically reframed) payloads into external memory stores or RAG documents. These payloads bypass conventional inference-time plaintext content filters, persist across session boundaries, and remain dormant…

LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3 Haiku, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+2 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct

Agent Lifecycle Compound Threats

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Taming openclaw: Security analysis and mitigation of autonomous llm agent threats
Evaluated models: Not reported

GCG Suffix Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

LLM Copyright Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can bypass their internal copyright compliance mechanisms, causing them to generate verbatim copyrighted text. The vulnerability stems from insufficient robustness against prompt engineering techniques that manipulate the model into ignoring or circumventing its safety filters designed for copyright protection.

SHIELD: Evaluation and Defense Strategies for Copyright Compliance in LLM Text Generation
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini Pro+5 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.