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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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3 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Quantization Contrastive Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A malicious model supply chain vulnerability exists involving a technique termed Adversarial Contrastive Learning (ACL) for Large Language Model (LLM) quantization attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to publish a model that appears benign and preserves high utility in full precision (e.g., BF16 or FP32) but exhibits malicious behaviors—such as jailbreak, over-refusal, or advertisement injection—immediately upon zero-shot quantization (e.g., INT8, FP4, or NF4).

Adversarial Contrastive Learning for LLM Quantization Attacks
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct, Llama 3.2 1B Instruct+1 more
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct

Aggressive Compression Model Theft

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) hosted on inference servers are vulnerable to high-speed weight exfiltration attacks due to the inherent compressibility of transformer parameters when decompression constraints are relaxed. Adversaries with compromised server access can utilize aggressive lossy compression techniques—specifically additive quantization combined with k-means clustering—to reduce model size by factors of 16x to 100x (e.g., <1 bit per parameter). Unlike standard quantization for…

Aggressive Compression Enables LLM Weight Theft
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 1.5B, Qwen 2 7B, Qwen 2.5 0.5B+2 more
  • Qwen 2 1.5B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 0.5B
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B
  • Pythia 70M

RLHF Preference Data Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

An untrusted reinforcement-learning-from-human-feedback (RLHF) platform can selectively manipulate preference samples associated with an attacker's target domain. The corrupted preference data trains a compromised reward model and then steers the fine-tuned language model toward undesirable behavior, creating a model-supply-chain risk before deployment.

LLM Misalignment via Adversarial RLHF Platforms
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.