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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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5 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Chunky Post-Training Miscalibration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability termed "chunky post-training," where the model learns spurious correlations between incidental prompt features (e.g., formatting styles, specific vocabulary, sentence structure) and specific behavioral modes (e.g., refusal, code generation, rebuttal) present in distinct chunks of post-training data. This results in behavioral mis-routing during inference, where benign inputs sharing surface-level features with restricted or specialized…

Chunky Post-Training: Data Driven Failures of Generalization
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5+5 more
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • GPT-5.1
  • Grok 4.1 Mini
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Tülu 3 405B

Metacognitive Prompting Lowers Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Prompt Injection Alignment Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

Benign LLM Secondary Risks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to "Secondary Risks," a class of non-adversarial failures where the model generates harmful, misleading, or unsafe outputs in response to benign, non-malicious user prompts. Unlike jailbreaks which require adversarial inputs, secondary risks arise from imperfect generalization and alignment failures during standard interactions. This vulnerability manifests primarily in two primitives: 1. Excessive…

Exploring the Secondary Risks of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4 Turbo+9 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Phi-4
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • LLaVA OneVision Qwen2 72B
  • Pixtral 12B
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6

Unchallenged Premise Misinformation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to implicit misinformation propagation due to sycophantic compliance with false premises. When a user prompt embeds a factually incorrect assumption or conspiracy theory as an unchallenged premise (implicit presupposition) rather than asking for verification, the model frequently fails to detect the falsehood. Instead of correcting the user, the model hallucinates a response that accepts, validates, and reinforces the false premise. This…

How to Protect Yourself from 5G Radiation? Investigating LLM Responses to Implicit Misinformation
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+11 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.3 70B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.