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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

32 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Controlled safety-tuning experiments link boilerplate refusal statements to unnecessary refusals of benign requests. Request-specific rationales improve benign compliance, with benchmark-dependent safety tradeoffs.

Refuse without Refusal: A Structural Analysis of Safety-Tuning Responses for Reducing False Refusals in Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B v0.3, Gemma 2 9B +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/4/2026
Analyzed 9/9/2026

KoNA measures whether vision-language models answer valid image questions while refusing unsafe components or correcting unsupported premises. Its 9,300 question-answer pairs include mixed and fully answerable controls.

Knowing What Not to Answer: Selective Non-Compliance in Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: InternVL3 2B Instruct, InternVL3-78B-Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) optimized via Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) are vulnerable to context pollution in their reasoning traces. An attacker can induce catastrophic reasoning failure by injecting locally coherent but logically or mathematically corrupted snippets into the model's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or conditioning context. Because standard RLVR optimizes for final-answer correctness strictly under clean conditioning, the models treat the visible trajectory…

Learning Robust Reasoning through Guided Adversarial Self-Play
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B, DeepScaleR 1.5B, Qwen 3 4B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability termed "chunky post-training," where the model learns spurious correlations between incidental prompt features (e.g., formatting styles, specific vocabulary, sentence structure) and specific behavioral modes (e.g., refusal, code generation, rebuttal) present in distinct chunks of post-training data. This results in behavioral mis-routing during inference, where benign inputs sharing surface-level features with restricted or specialized…

Chunky Post-Training: Data Driven Failures of Generalization
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5 +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Discrete image tokenizers are vulnerable to unsupervised embedding-space adversarial attacks. Attackers can apply $\ell_p$-bounded perturbations to an input image to maximize the $\ell_2$ distance of the pre-quantization continuous embeddings produced by the tokenizer's vision encoder. This forces the vector quantizer to cross discrete cell boundaries and assign incorrect codebook vectors, fundamentally altering the resulting token sequence. Because the attack targets the pre-quantization…

On the Adversarial Robustness of Discrete Image Tokenizers
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) aligned via standard preference-based optimization methods (e.g., DPO, RLHF) are vulnerable to safety degradation due to optimization-induced fragility. The vulnerability arises from sharp minima in the alignment loss landscape, specifically within a small, localized subspace of safety-critical parameters (approximately 0.5% of neurons account for >80% of worst-case alignment loss). Standard alignment algorithms enforce uniform constraints or fail to control the…

Revisiting Robustness for LLM Safety Alignment via Selective Geometry Control
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.2 3B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing standard fine-tuning (SFT) or alignment techniques (RLHF/DPO) are vulnerable to training-time data poisoning attacks that exploit the sequential nature of token generation. Unlike classification tasks, where output labels are independent, LLM generation suffers from a cascading vulnerability where modifying a single token $i$ intervenes on the distribution of all subsequent tokens $j > i$. An adversary can inject a small fraction of…

Towards Poisoning Robustness Certification for Natural Language Generation
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A vulnerability exists in the post-training alignment of Flow Matching models (specifically FLUX.1-dev) when utilizing Visual Foundation Models (VFM) (e.g., DINOv3b) as discriminators or when employing standalone Reward Gradient optimization (e.g., HPSv3). These feedback mechanisms lack sufficient capacity or structural guidance to constrain the generative policy, making the discriminator's gradients susceptible to "reward hacking." Consequently, the generative policy over-optimizes for the…

FAIL: Flow Matching Adversarial Imitation Learning for Image Generation
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.