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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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7 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Prefix Cache Reconstruction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Automatic Prefix Caching (APC) in multi-tenant LLM serving systems introduces a timing side-channel vulnerability that permits cross-tenant data leakage. APC shares computed Key-Value (KV) tensors across different users when their requests share identical initial tokens. Because reusing cached tensors is significantly faster than recomputing them, a measurable difference in Time-To-First-Token (TTFT) exists between cache hits and misses. An attacker can exploit this shared cache by sending…

PrefixWall: Mitigating Prefix Caching Side Channels in Shared LLM Systems
Evaluated models: Gemma 3 4B IT, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 2 13B Chat+6 more
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • LLaVA OneVision Qwen2 0.5B
  • LLaVA OneVision Qwen2 7B Chat
  • Qwen2-VL 2B Instruct
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct

Logit Leakage Model Clone

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) inference APIs that expose top-k logits or log-probabilities are vulnerable to model extraction and cloning. An attacker can execute a two-stage attack to replicate the proprietary model without access to weights, gradients, or training data. First, by submitting fewer than 10,000 random queries and aggregating the returned unrounded logits, the attacker recovers the model's output projection matrix using Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). Second, the attacker…

Clone What You Can't Steal: Black-Box LLM Replication via Logit Leakage and Distillation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, Mistral 7B

KV-Cache Sharing Timing Side-channel

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-tenant Large Language Model (LLM) inference systems utilizing global Key-Value (KV) cache sharing are vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. By measuring the Time-To-First-Token (TTFT) latency of crafted API requests, an unprivileged remote attacker can determine if specific token sequences have been previously processed and cached by the system for other users. This observable timing difference between cache hits (low TTFT) and cache misses (high TTFT) allows for the token-by-token…

Selective KV-Cache Sharing to Mitigate Timing Side-Channels in LLM Inference
Evaluated models: Phi-4 14B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B, Qwen 3 32B+3 more
  • Phi-4 14B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • DeepSeek R1

Activation Steering Leaks PII

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to activation steering attacks that bypass safety and privacy mechanisms. By manipulating internal attention head activations using lightweight linear probes trained on refusal/disclosure behavior, an attacker can induce the model to reveal Personally Identifiable Information (PII) memorized during training, including sensitive attributes like sexual orientation, relationships, and life events. The attack does not require adversarial prompts or…

PII Jailbreaking in LLMs via Activation Steering Reveals Personal Information Leakage
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 9B, GLM 9B, GPT-4+4 more
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GLM 9B
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 7B
  • Qwen 7B

Obfuscated Activations Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate obfuscated activations, bypassing latent-space defenses such as sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent out-of-distribution (OOD) detection. Attackers can manipulate model inputs or training data to produce outputs exhibiting malicious behavior while remaining undetected by these defenses. This occurs because the models can represent harmful behavior through diverse activation patterns, allowing attackers to…

Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B, Llama 3 8B Instruct

LLM Version Fingerprinting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated into applications reveal unique behavioral fingerprints through responses to crafted queries. LLMmap exploits this by sending carefully constructed prompts and analyzing the responses to identify the specific LLM version with high accuracy (over 95% in testing against 42 LLMs). This allows attackers to tailor attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities specific to the identified LLM version.

Llmmap: Fingerprinting for large language models
Evaluated models: Aya-23-8B, Cohere-35B, GPT-4+9 more
  • Aya-23-8B
  • Cohere-35B
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • OpenChat 3.5
  • Phi-3-medium-28k-instruct
  • Phi 3 Medium 4k Instruct
  • Smaug-llama-3-70B-instruct
  • Solar-10.7B-instruct-v1.0

LLM Causal Neuron Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama 2 and Vicuna exhibit a vulnerability where specific layers (e.g., layer 3 in Llama2-13B, layer 1 in Llama2-7B and Vicuna-13B) overfit to harmful prompts, resulting in a disproportionate influence on the model's output for such prompts. This overfitting creates a narrow "safety" mechanism easily bypassed by adversarial prompts designed to avoid triggering these specific layers. Additionally, a single neuron (e.g., neuron 2100 in Llama2 and Vicuna)…

Causality analysis for evaluating the security of large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2-13B-chat-hf, Llama 2-7B-chat-hf+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2-13B-chat-hf
  • Llama 2-7B-chat-hf
  • Vicuna-13B Version 1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.