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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

27 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Private Attribute Inference

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Attribute Inference Attacks, where an attacker exploits the model's reasoning capabilities to deduce sensitive personal attributes (e.g., age, gender, location, income level) from seemingly innocuous, unclassified user-generated text. Unlike traditional privacy leaks that rely on the memorization of training data, this vulnerability leverages the model's zero-shot inference and contextual deduction. Because the attack prompts are benign in nature…

Stop Tracking Me! Proactive Defense Against Attribute Inference Attack in LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+5 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Evolutionary Hidden Knowledge Recovery

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) subjected to machine unlearning techniques (specifically AltPO, GradDiff, IDKDPO, IDKNLL, UNDIAL, NPO, and SimNPO) contain a vulnerability regarding the persistence of latent knowledge. Despite achieving high "forgetting" scores on standard, benign benchmarks, these models remain susceptible to black-box evolutionary adversarial attacks. An attacker can utilize an automated framework (REBEL) comprising a "Hacker" model and a "Judge" model to iteratively mutate…

REBEL: Hidden Knowledge Recovery via Evolutionary-Based Evaluation Loop
Evaluated models: Not reported

Zero-Training Cross-Domain Inversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A cryptographic weakness exists in the privacy assumptions of vector embeddings used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems and Vector Databases. The vulnerability, designated "Zero2Text," allows an unauthenticated attacker to reconstruct raw text from captured vector embeddings without access to the victim model's parameters, gradients, or training data. Unlike prior embedding inversion attacks that require training large decoders on domain-specific datasets, this vulnerability…

Zero2Text: Zero-Training Cross-Domain Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Input PII Leakage

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Unintended input-only PII memorization in fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows remote attackers to extract sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as names, medical records, and financial details. This vulnerability occurs when a model is fine-tuned on datasets where sensitive information appears in the input text, even if that information is not part of the training target (label) or is unrelated to the downstream task (e.g., classification). The fine-tuning process…

Unintended Memorization of Sensitive Information in Fine-Tuned Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 1B

Activation-Level Privacy Leak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Conversational Large Language Model (LLM) agents integrated with privileged data sources (e.g., medical records, organizational emails) are vulnerable to contextually inappropriate information disclosure due to failures in enforcing Contextual Integrity (CI) norms. Standard semantic input/output filters and generic safety guardrails (e.g., Llama Guard) fail to detect "mosaic attacks" and multi-turn conversational manipulation. In these attacks, adversaries decompose a malicious query into a…

NeuroFilter: Privacy Guardrails for Conversational LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 7B+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B

Production LLM Copyright Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Production Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to long-form training data extraction via a two-phase prompt injection attack. This vulnerability allows an attacker to recover substantial portions of memorized, copyrighted text (such as novels) by exploiting the model's autoregressive text completion capabilities. The attack methodology involves two distinct phases: 1. Prefix Completion Probe: The attacker provides a short "seed" sequence (e.g., the first sentence of a book) coupled…

Extracting Books from Production Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet 20250219, GPT-4.1 2025-04-14, Gemini 2.5 Pro+1 more
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet 20250219
  • GPT-4.1 2025-04-14
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 3

Guardrail Policy Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A black-box guardrail reverse-engineering vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) serving systems that employ output filtering mechanisms. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to replicate the proprietary decision-making policy and rule sets of the target's safety guardrail without direct access to model parameters. This is achieved through a technique termed Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack (GRA), which utilizes a reinforcement learning framework combined with genetic…

Black-Box Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B

Pervasive Multi-turn Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multiple open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs)—specifically those prioritizing capability over safety alignment—exhibit a critical vulnerability to adaptive multi-turn prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. While these models effectively reject isolated, single-turn adversarial inputs (averaging ~13.11% Attack Success Rate), they fail to maintain safety guardrails and policy enforcement across extended conversational contexts. By leveraging iterative strategies such as "Crescendo" (gradual…

Death by a Thousand Prompts: Open Model Vulnerability Analysis
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Mistral Large 2+5 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large 2
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Phi-4
  • GLM 4.5 Air

Latent Space Discontinuity Exploitation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.