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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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13 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 7/15/2026
Analyzed 7/21/2026

The paper presents SkillSec-Eval, a controlled evaluation of attacks against reusable agent skills across repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, runtime execution, and updates. It reports that malicious metadata, retrieval manipulation, unsafe workflow composition, and poisoned updates can cause agents to retrieve, select, or execute unintended skills. These are paper-reported benchmark results, not independently verified vulnerabilities in a named production product.

Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
Evaluated models: all-MiniLM-L6-v2, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to iterative knowledge-extraction attacks designed to reconstruct the underlying private knowledge base. The vulnerability exists due to the decoupled optimization of the retrieval and generation phases. Attackers can craft adversarial queries consisting of two distinct components: an "Information" component (optimized via gradient descent or random sampling to steer embeddings toward specific, diverse regions of the vector space) and…

Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

The paper describes a reproducible black-box indirect prompt injection evaluation for embedding-based RAG and agent systems. It separates a poisoned document into a retrieval-optimized trigger fragment and an instruction-bearing attack fragment, showing that one injected item can be surfaced by natural queries and then influence model output or agent behavior. These are paper-reported findings; they were not independently verified here.

Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Qwen 3 0.6B +19 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Text-to-Video (T2V) diffusion models are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt attacks that degrade output quality regarding semantic fidelity and temporal dynamics. This vulnerability is exploited via the T2VAttack framework, which utilizes two primary vector strategies: T2VAttack-S (Substitution) and T2VAttack-I (Insertion). T2VAttack-S leverages a greedy search to identify key semantic tokens and replaces them with high-similarity synonyms defined in lexical databases (e.g., WordNet)…

T2VAttack: Adversarial Attack on Text-to-Video Diffusion Models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/1/2025

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2025
Analyzed 10/31/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1 +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.