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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

5 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

No-Prompt Reasoning Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

An implicit reasoning hijacking vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and LLM-based agent frameworks. Attackers with write access to an agent's external memory or knowledge base can inject adversarially optimized malicious instances that trigger jailbreaks without requiring any modifications to the user's input prompt. The attack utilizes a shadow model to extract high-contribution subword tokens from anticipated benign user queries via log-probability changes and…

Stop Fixating on Prompts: Reasoning Hijacking and Constraint Tightening for Red-Teaming LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, GPT-5+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 3.0 Pro
  • ERNIE 3.5

Retrieval Memory Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the similarity-based retrieval mechanisms of long-term memory-augmented Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically affecting systems like Mem0 and A-mem. The vulnerability arises from the system's reliance on dense embedding similarity (e.g., cosine similarity) to retrieve context from dynamic, user-generated memory banks without sufficient semantic validation or conflict resolution. An unprivileged remote attacker can exploit this by injecting "adversarial…

ER-MIA: Black-Box Adversarial Memory Injection Attacks on Long-Term Memory-Augmented Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 27B

Zombie Agent Persistence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Optimized Indirect Prompt Injection Crosses Retrieval Barrier

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a reproducible black-box indirect prompt injection evaluation for embedding-based RAG and agent systems. It separates a poisoned document into a retrieval-optimized trigger fragment and an instruction-bearing attack fragment, showing that one injected item can be surfaced by natural queries and then influence model output or agent behavior. These are paper-reported findings; they were not independently verified here.

Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Qwen 3 0.6B+19 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 1.7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen3-11B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • gte-modernbert-base
  • OpenAI text-embedding-3-small
  • Voyage AI voyage-3.5-lite
  • Alibaba Cloud text-embedding-v4
  • contriever-msmarco
  • Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B
  • Qwen3-Embedding-4B
  • Qwen3-Embedding-8B

Agent Tool Selection Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct+5 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.